IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

DANIEL J CHAPLIN

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 10A-UI-04322-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE

Employer

OC: 01/24/10

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

United Parcel Service (employer) appealed a representative's March 9, 2010 decision (reference 01) that concluded Daniel J. Chaplin (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 4, 2010. The claimant participated in the hearing. Steven Jackson appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, a review of the law, and assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on February 23, 2009. He worked part time (about 25 hours per week) as a night shift maintenance mechanic in the employer's Davenport, lowa distribution hub. His last day of work was March 23, 2009. The employer discharged him on March 25, 2009. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism during his 30-day probationary period.

The claimant called in sick prior to his shift on March 24, 2009. On March 25, he again called in before his shift and reported that he was still sick, but that he had a doctor's note. The facility manager to whom he spoke indicated that it did not matter, that the claimant was discharged for missing work during his probationary period.

During the hearing the employer's witness, Mr. Jackson, who was not directly involved in the separation, initially had no information regarding the claimant's employment, even such information as his dates of employment. After the claimant provided his testimony, Mr. Jackson indicated that rather than the claimant's absences being two instances of properly called in absences for illness, that the claimant had three sequential absences, that some of them were

not called in, and that one of them was supposedly due to a car accident. The employer had no personal knowledge or supportive evidence to this effect. The administrative law judge finds that this testimony on the part of Mr. Jackson is not credible.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. lowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (lowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984).

Absenteeism can constitute misconduct; however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. 871 IAC 24.32(7). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. 871 IAC 24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's absences were not due to properly reported illness; a mere allegation without additional credible evidence is not sufficient. 871 IAC 24.32. Because the final absences were related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. Cosper, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's March 9, 2010 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynotto A. F. Donnor

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs