IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

CRAIG A CONNETT SR

Claimant

APPEAL 16A-UI-02715-SC-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

DOLGENCORP LLC

Employer

OC: 02/14/16

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-Finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Dolgencorp, LLC (employer) filed an appeal from the February 26, 2016 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits based upon the determination that Craig A. Connett, Sr. (claimant) did not engage in willful or deliberate misconduct. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on March 28, 2016. The claimant participated on his own behalf. The employer participated through Store Manager Paul Vandersee. Employer's Exhibits One and Two were received.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits and, if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the Agency be waived?

Can charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed part-time as a Lead Sales Associate beginning on October 6, 2015 and was separated from employment on February 14, 2016; when he was discharged. The claimant reported directly to Store Manager Paul Vandersee. The claimant was typically responsible for opening the store but was being trained by Vandersee on how to close the store.

On February 8, 2016, the claimant had been asked to cover the closing shift for an employee who was not available. He had only closed the store on two other occasions and both times Vandersee returned to the store to assist with the closing procedure. On the evening of February 8, 2016, Vandersee did not return to the store to assist the claimant with the closing procedures. The claimant became flustered trying to close the store by himself and he left the safe open with the deposit in it.

The following morning, Vandersee found the safe open and left a voice message for District Manager Pat McNorton explaining the situation. The claimant worked that day but Vandersee did not say anything about the safe. The claimant also worked Wednesday, February 10, 2016. McNorton contacted Vandersee on Friday, February 12, 2016 and directed him to discharge the claimant. The claimant and Vandersee were not able to talk until February 14, 2016; which is when Vandersee notified the claimant he was discharged for failing to protect the employer's assets.

The employer has a policy stating that the safe is to remain closed and locked at all times. The policy does not address what happens to an employee who leaves the safe open. The employer also has a progressive disciplinary policy. However, the practice at the claimant's store was to discharge an employee who left the safe open on his or her first infraction.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa Ct. App. 1988). A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

The conduct for which the claimant was discharged was an isolated incident of poor judgment and inasmuch as the employer had not previously warned the claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that the claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

As benefits are allowed, the issues of overpayment, repayment, and chargeability of the employer's account are moot.

DECISION:

The February 26, 2016 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible. The issues of overpayment, repayment, and chargeability of the employer's account are moot.

Stephanie R. Callahan Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	

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