BEFORE THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD

Lucas State Office Building Fourth floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319

:

JACKIE L PERRY

HEARING NUMBER: 10B-UI-01712

Claimant,

:

and : **EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD**

DECISION

BIG MEADOWS :

Employer.

NOTICE

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a request for a REHEARING is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within 20 days of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT IS FILED WITHIN 30 days of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-1, 96.3-7

DECISION

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE ALLOWED IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE

The claimant appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. The Appeal Board finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Employment Appeal Board adopts and incorporates as its own the administrative law judge's Findings of Fact with the following addition:

When the claimant returned to offer her services that last week in January of 2010, the new Human Resources person pulled out Ms. Perry's employment file and reviewed all the claimant's disciplinary actions from her work history with the claimant.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2009) provides:

Discharge for Misconduct. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

Misconduct is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The Iowa Supreme court has accepted this definition as reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Lee v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665, (Iowa 2000) (quoting <u>Reigelsberger v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

The record establishes that the claimant was on medical leave beginning August 9th after she suffered what appeared to be a nonwork-related injury. Although Ms. Perry returned to the employer to offer her services, she was not allowed to return with restrictions as the employer had no light duty available for nonwork-related injuries. The employer admits telling Ms. Perry to return when she had a full medical release. However, when she did return to offer her services once again in late January of 2010, the employer believed it was a "moot point" to consider the claimant's light duty restrictions because based on the claimant's employment file, the claimant had too many disciplinary actions issued against her to warrant rehiring her. Based on this record, we conclude that the employer initiated the claimant's

separation while she was still on medical leave awaiting return.		

871 IAC 24.1(113)"c" provides:

Discharge. A discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer for such reasons as incompetence, violation of rules, dishonesty, laziness, absenteeism, insubordination, failure to pass probationary period.

The employer does not elaborate on what act or acts, nor the date or dates of the acts' commission that led to the employer's decision to sever their employment relationship. All that the employer testified to was the fact that Ms. Perry had numerous disciplines in her file.

871 IAC 24.32(4) provides:

Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established.

Essentially, the employer chose to terminate her on January 24th for poor work history or performance, and not because she had no full release. The court in <u>Richers v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 479 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 1991) held that inability or incapacity to perform well is not volitional and thus, cannot be deemed misconduct. The employer has failed to satisfy their burden of proof.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated March 22, 2010 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, she is allowed benefits provided she is otherwise eligible.

John A. Peno	
Elizabeth L. Seiser	
Enzacetti E. Seiser	
Monique F. Kuester	