IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

RAY SLACK Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-02218-BT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MATRIX METALS LLC Employer

> OC: 11/16/08 R: 04 Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 - Voluntary Quit 871 IAC 24.25(4) - Voluntary Quit Without Good Cause Iowa Code § 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Ray Slack (claimant) appealed an unemployment insurance decision dated January 15, 2009, reference 01, which held that he was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily quit his employment with Matrix Metals, LLC (employer) without good cause attributable to the employer. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on March 5, 2009. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer participated through Linda Lefler, Human Resources Assistant. Exhibit D-1 was admitted into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether the claimant's appeal is timely and, if so, whether his voluntary separation from employment qualifies him to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and having considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on January 15, 2009. The claimant testified he did not receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by January 25, 2009. The appeal was not filed until February 13, 2009, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

The claimant was employed as a full-time grinder from August 18, 2008 through November 10, 2008. The employer's attendance policy provides an employee is considered a voluntary quit if he is a no-call/no-show for three consecutive workdays. The claimant was a no-call/no-show for three days ending on November 10, 2008 and was considered to have voluntarily quit his employment. He testified that he quit his employment due to a hand injury from a previous job. No medical documentation was provided to the employer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be determined is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. If a party fails to make a timely appeal of a representative's decision and there is no legal excuse under which the appeal can be deemed to have been made timely, the decision as to the merits has become final and is not subject to further review. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v.</u> <u>Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. <u>Messina v. IDJS</u>, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also <u>In re Appeal of Elliott</u>, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. <u>Hendren v. IESC</u>, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); <u>Smith v. IESC</u>, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

A party does not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal if the delay is due to Agency error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service. 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2, and the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

The substantive issue in this case is whether the reasons for the claimant's separation from employment qualify him to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if he voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code § 96.5-1.

871 IAC 24.25(4) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa

Code § 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code § 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(4) The claimant was absent for three days without giving notice to employer in violation of company rule.

In general, a voluntary quit requires evidence of an intention to sever the employment relationship and an overt act carrying out that intention. Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980) and Peck v. Employment Appeal Bd., 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). The claimant demonstrated his intent to quit and acted to carry it out when he failed to call or report to work after November 6, 2008. He was deemed a voluntary quit on November 10, 2008, after three days of no-call/no-show.

It is the claimant's burden to prove that the voluntary quit was for a good cause that would not disqualify him. Iowa Code § 96.6-2. He voluntarily quit his employment due to a non-work-related medical injury. A voluntary quit is not attributable to the employer if caused by illness not connected to the employment. <u>Wolf's v. IESC</u>I, 244 Iowa 999, 59 N.W.2d 216 (1953). The claimant's separation was not with good cause attributable to the employer and benefits are denied.

DECISION:

The appeal was timely. The unemployment insurance decision dated January 15, 2009, reference 01, is affirmed. The claimant voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until he has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Susan D. Ackerman Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

sda/kjw