IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

JUSTIN R FORS

Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-03459-DB-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

WINGER CONTRACTING CO

Employer

OC: 03/01/20

Claimant: Appellant (1R)

Iowa Code 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the March 16, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that found that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits based upon him voluntarily quitting work without good cause. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on May 18, 2020. The claimant, Justin R. Fors, participated personally. The employer, Winger Contracting Co., did not participate.

ISSUE:

Did the claimant file a timely appeal?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

A decision that disqualified the claimant from receipt of unemployment insurance benefits was mailed to the claimant's correct address of record on March 16, 2020. The claimant received the decision and did not disagree with it. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 26, 2020. The claimant filed his appeal on April 24, 2020.

The claimant believes that he has earned ten times his weekly benefit amount since his disqualifying separation from employment with this employer on February 21, 2020. The issue of whether the claimant has earned ten times his weekly benefit amount with Winger Contracting Co. (during his second period of employment) following his disqualifying separation from employment on February 21, 2020 is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation and determination.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's appeal is untimely.

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of § 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disgualified for benefits pursuant to § 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving § 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to § 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving § 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding § 96.8, subsection 5.

(emphasis added).

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Bd. of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

Claimant's failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2). As such, the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2) and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

While the claimant may not be eligible for regular State of Iowa unemployment insurance benefits, he may be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits that have been made available to claimants under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ("Cares Act"). The Pandemic Unemployment Assistance ("PUA") section of the Cares Act discusses eligibility for claimants who are unemployed due to the Coronavirus. For claimants who are ineligible for regular unemployment insurance benefits under Iowa Code Chapter 96, they may be eligible under PUA.

Note to Claimant: If this decision determines you are not eligible for regular unemployment insurance benefits and you disagree with this decision, you may file an appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by following the instructions on the first page of this decision. Individuals who do not qualify for regular unemployment insurance benefits, but who are currently unemployed for reasons related to COVID-19 may qualify for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). **You will need to apply for PUA to determine your eligibility under the program.** Additional information on how to apply for PUA can be found at https://www.iowaworkforcedevelopment.gov/pua-information.

DECISION:

The March 16, 2020 (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

REMAND:

The issue of whether the claimant has earned ten times his weekly benefit amount since his disqualifying separation from employment on February 21, 2020 with Winger Contracting Co. during his second period of employment is remanded to the Benefits Bureau for an initial investigation and determination.

Jaun Boucher

Dawn Boucher Administrative Law Judge

May 21, 2020
Decision Dated and Mailed

db/mh