

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

ELIZABETH A VAN SANT
Claimant

JELD-WEN INC
Employer

APPEAL 20A-UI-02216-DB-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 02/16/20
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the March 10, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that found the claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits due to her discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 22, 2020. The claimant, Elizabeth A. Van Sant, participated personally. The employer, Jeld-Wen Inc., did not participate. The administrative law judge telephoned the employer's witness, Mark Shaw, at the telephone number that was registered to be contacted at for the hearing, but there was no answer. The claimant waived due notice of the potential issue of overpayment of regular unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.3(7) and the potential issue of overpayment of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation pursuant to PL 116-136 § 2104(6). The administrative law judge took official notice of the claimant's unemployment insurance benefits records.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a layup stapler. She was employed from July 17, 2018 until February 21, 2020. Claimant's immediate supervisor was John Routirre.

The employer has a written attendance policy and claimant was aware of the policy. Claimant was discharged from employment due to attendance. The final incident leading to discharge occurred on February 13, 2020. Claimant was tardy to work on February 13, 2020 due to weather and transportation issues. She notified her employer that she would be tardy to work prior to her shift beginning.

Claimant was tardy to work and left work early on February 3, 2020 due to personal illness. She notified the employer that she would be tardy to work and left work early that date due to illness.

Claimant was tardy to work on January 20, 2020 due to weather and transportation issues. She did notify her employer prior to her shift beginning that she would be tardy to work.

Claimant was absent from work on December 16, 2019 and December 19, 2019 due to personal illness. She notified the employer prior to her scheduled shift start times on both dates that she would be absent from work due to illness.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in

disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Unemployment statutes should be interpreted liberally to achieve the legislative goal of minimizing the burden of involuntary unemployment.” *Cosper v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1982). The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Id.* at 11. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. *Id.* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Id.* at 558.

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding “rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law.” The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not “properly reported.” *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982).

The term “absenteeism” also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as “tardiness.” An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (Iowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Iowa 1982). Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but


not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer's interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.*

Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. See *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable. Two absences would be the minimum amount in order to determine whether these repeated acts were excessive. Further, in the cases of absenteeism it is the law, not the employer's attendance policies, which determines whether absences are excused or unexcused. *Gaborit*, 743 N.W.2d at 557-58 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

In this case, the employer failed to present any evidence that the claimant had an excessive amount of unexcused absences in violation of its attendance policy. Without establishing excessive absenteeism, this separation from employment is not disqualifying. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. Because benefits are allowed, the issues of overpayment of unemployment insurance benefits and overpayment of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation are moot.

DECISION:

The March 10, 2020 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision denying benefits is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.



Dawn Boucher
Administrative Law Judge

April 24, 2020
Decision Dated and Mailed

db/scn