IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

JUSTIN E WIEBENSOHN Claimant **CDI LLC** Employer	**APPEAL 17A-UI-04797-NM-T** **ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION** **OC: 12/25/16** **Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the April 27, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon his voluntary quit. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on May 23, 2017. The claimant participated and testified. The employer participated through General Managers David Nagle and Jack Miller, Human Resource Manager Merle Rockshus, and Supervisor Ron Fordyce. Office Manager Pam Wilson was also present on behalf of the employer but did not testify. Employer's Exhibit 1 was received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Did claimant voluntarily leave the employment with good cause attributable to the employer or did employer discharge the claimant for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as a painter from July 29, 2003, until this employment ended on April 4, 2017.

On April 2, 2017, claimant sent a text message to Wilson informing her that he would not be at work in Charles City the following day because he was going to the Forest City location to speak with Nagle about his work situation in Charles City. The following day when claimant arrived at the Forest City location, he was told that Nagle was not there but would be able to meet with him the following day. On April 3, 2017, claimant sat down and spoke with Nagle. During the conversation, a text message that claimant had sent to Wilson was brought up. (Exhibit 1). Nagle was upset by the message and asked claimant if it meant he quit. Claimant indicated that he was just frustrated with his situation and did not intend the message to mean he quit. Nagle then informed claimant there was no work available to him at the Forest City location and Miller did not want him to return to work at the Charles City location. Miller testified he did not want

claimant to continue working at his location because he was not reliable, as he had missed two days in the few weeks prior. Claimant had no prior disciplinary action and had never been warned about his attendance or that his job may be in jeopardy.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not voluntarily quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code §96.5(1) provides:

> An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
>
> 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

A voluntary quitting means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer and requires an intention to terminate the employment. *Wills v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 447 N.W. 2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989); *see also* Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35). A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. *Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer*, 289 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Iowa 1980). Where a claimant walked off the job without permission before the end of his shift saying he wanted a meeting with management the next day, the Iowa Court of Appeals ruled this was not a voluntary quit because the claimant's expressed desire to meet with management was evidence that he wished to maintain the employment relationship. Such cases must be analyzed as a discharge from employment. *Peck v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Here, claimant was specifically asked if he was quitting and told the employer he was not. Therefore, this case must be analyzed as a discharge from employment.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

> An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
>
> 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
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> a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

> Discharge for misconduct.
>
> (1) Definition.
>
> a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer

> has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

> (7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra.

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra.*

Claimant was discharged because Miller had concerns about his reliability based on recent absences. Claimant had no prior disciplinary action and had not been warned his job was in jeopardy. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has

not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The April 27, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit but was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. Benefits withheld based upon this separation shall be paid to claimant.

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Nicole Merrill
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/scn