

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

CARLOS A GARCIA
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 14A-UI-10857-B2T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

VALERO SERVICES INC
Employer

**OC: 09/21/14
Claimant: Respondent (2R)**

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.3-7 – Recovery of Overpayment of Benefits
871 IA Admin. Code 24(10) – Employer Participation in Fact Finding

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed an appeal from a decision of a representative dated October 9, 2014, reference 02, which held claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. After due notice, a hearing was scheduled for and held on November 25, 2014. Claimant did not participate personally, but was represented by his attorney Willis Hamilton. Employer participated by Director of Human Resources Bob Abbott. Employer's Exhibits One through Six were admitted into evidence.

ISSUES:

Whether claimant was discharged for misconduct?

Whether claimant was overpaid benefits?

If claimant was overpaid benefits, should claimant repay benefits or should employer be charged due to employer's participation or lack thereof in fact finding?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: Claimant last worked for employer on September 13, 2014. Employer discharged claimant on September 22, 2014 because claimant violated the protocol for use of dangerous chemicals in the cleaning of towers. Claimant knew or should have known that he was not to use sulphuric acid in the cleaning of large cylinders without the approval of his supervisor and the plant manager, at a minimum.

Claimant had previously received a final written warning on May 15, 2014 when claimant had failed to do proper monitoring and provide proper paperwork regarding a cleaning within a plant of employer. Claimant had explained on that occasion that he was in a hurry and acknowledged that his actions were unsafe.

In the last, most recent action; claimant had not contacted managers or supervisors before deciding to use sulphuric acid to clean a cylinder. Employer explained that each time sulphuric acid is contemplated being used to clean, all necessary supervisors and managers up to a district vice president are to be contacted because of the great possibility for damage to equipment or injury to those using the acid. When claimant used the sulphuric acid, he did wear appropriate safety gear and follow appropriate safety procedures. But as sulphuric acid is by its nature an extremely caustic agent, it caused damage to the equipment and put precision instruments out of spec.

Employer stated that claimant had likely cleaned these cylinders using the sulphuric acid in the past. Any time in the past that it was done supervisors would have been contacted and a conference call would have been held to determine if the cylinder needed the extreme action of cleaning with sulphuric acid and its attendant problems (ie damage to equipment and necessity to carefully clean the acid after its use) would eliminate the need to do that type of cleaning at the present time.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Code § 96.3-7, as amended in 2008, provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment. The employer shall not be charged with the benefits.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if unrebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum,

the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982), Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

In order to establish misconduct as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in

deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon supra*; *Henry supra*. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon supra*; *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

In this matter, the evidence established that claimant was discharged for an act of misconduct when claimant violated employer's policy concerning proper procedures to be followed in the use of sulphuric acid. The last incident, which brought about the discharge, constitutes misconduct because claimant's actions were inherently dangerous and put the company's interests at risk. As claimant had previously used correct processes in cleaning cylinders in the past, employer had the right to expect claimant to follow those procedures. Unquestionably claimant deliberately acted in such a way as to put employer's interests at risk. The administrative law judge holds that claimant was discharged for an act of misconduct and, as such, is disqualified for the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits.

As claimant is disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits, claimant is deemed to have been overpaid benefits for those amounts received in this matter. This matter is remanded to the fact finder to determine the amount of overpayment. Employer did participate in the fact-finding hearing to an extent that employer's account shall not be charged.

DECISION:

The decision of the representative dated October 9, 2014, reference 02, is reversed. Unemployment insurance benefits shall be withheld until claimant has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times claimant's weekly benefit amount, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

This matter is remanded to the fact finder to determine the amount of overpayment. Employer's account shall not be charged as employer substantially participated in fact finding.

Blair A. Bennett
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

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