

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JOHN S TEW
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-03976-CT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

MANPOWER INC OF DES MOINES
Employer

**Original Claim: 02/03/08
Claimant: Appellant (4)**

Section 96.5(1)g – Voluntary Quit/Requalification
Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeals

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

John Tew filed an appeal from a representative's decision dated March 25, 2008, reference 04, which denied benefits based on his separation from Manpower, Inc. of Des Moines (Manpower). Due notice was issued scheduling a hearing by telephone on April 8, 2009. Because Mr. Tew has requalified for benefits, a hearing was deemed unnecessary.

ISSUE:

At issue in this matter is whether the appeal filed herein was timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on March 25, 2008. The claimant received the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by April 4, 2008. The appeal was not filed until March 12, 2009, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

After his separation from Manpower on February 1, 2008, the claimant worked for Union Pacific Railroad. He earned \$26,144.13 in wages from Union Pacific Railroad during calendar year 2008.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall

determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6-2, and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

Although the appeal was untimely, the claimant has subsequently requalified for benefits by earning ten times his weekly benefit amount in insured wages after the disqualifying separation. Workforce Development issued a determination on March 12, 2009 (reference 02) holding that the claimant had requalified for benefits after the separation from Manpower. The employer has been relieved of benefit charges.

DECISION:

The representative's decision dated March 25, 2008, reference 04, is hereby modified. The appeal in this case was not timely and the decision of the representative remains in effect. The claimant has, however, requalified for benefits subsequent to the disqualifying decision. Benefits are allowed on his current claim, provided he is otherwise eligible, but shall not be charged to Manpower.

Carolyn F. Coleman
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

cfc/kjw