# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JIM E PINKERTON

Claimant

**APPEAL NO: 14A-UI-09720-DT** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

**DECISION** 

**JELD-WEN INC** 

Employer

OC: 12/29/13

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jeld-Wen, Inc. appealed a representative's September 10, 2014 (reference 03) decision that concluded Jim E. Pinkerton (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 8, 2014. The claimant participated in the hearing. Diana Duncan appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one witness, Jake Voogd. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

## ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

#### OUTCOME:

Affirmed. Benefits allowed.

## FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on June 5, 2013. He worked full time on the third shift as a shipper. His last day of work was August 20, 2014. The employer discharged him on August 21, 2014. The reason asserted for the discharge was an incident of alleged horseplay on the shift which ended on the morning of August 20.

The employer provided second-hand statements from three coworkers indicating that on the night of August 19 to the morning of August 20 the claimant and another employee had been on forklifts and had chased a third employee who was on an order picker to the point of putting the forklift tines under the order picker and lifting it up. The claimant denied that he had engaged in any horseplay or chasing, but indicated that his tines had gotten under the order picker when he came around a corner and the order picker had run over his tines; he denied there was any lifting. The employer acknowledged that the statement of the other employee who had been on the forklift was consistent with the claimant's version of events. However, because the employer determined to accept the version of events as described by the other employees, the employer determined to discharge the claimant.

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#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is the conclusion that he had engaged in unsafe horseplay on the morning of August 20. The employer relies exclusively on the second-hand account from the three other employees; however, without that information being provided first-hand, the administrative law judge is unable to ascertain whether those employees might have been mistaken, whether they actually observed the entire time, whether they are credible, or whether the employer's witness might have misinterpreted or misunderstood aspects of their reports. Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant in fact engaged in horseplay during that shift. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. *Cosper*, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

# **DECISION:**

The representative's September 10, 2014 (reference 03) de	ecision is affirmed.	The employer did
discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons.	The claimant is q	ualified to receive
unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible		

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/can