IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

STEPHEN A WILSON

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-12872-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ACCESS DIRECT TELEMARKETING INC

Employer

OC: 07/18/10

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Stephen A. Wilson (claimant) appealed a representative's August 31, 2010 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Access Direct Telemarketing, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on November 2, 2010. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's third-party representative received the hearing notice and responded by sending the Appeals Section some potential documentary evidence on October 28, 2010. However, the representative failed to respond to the hearing notice and did not call the Appeals Section to provide a telephone number at which an employer witness could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant's appeal timely or are there legal grounds under which it should be treated as timely?

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on August 31, 2010. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by September 10, 2010, a Friday. The claimant received the decision, but not until after September 10. The appeal was not filed until it was hand-delivered to a local Agency office from which it was faxed to the Appeals Section on September 15, 2010, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

The claimant started working for the employer in about January 2009. He worked full-time as a customer service representative in the employer's Ames, Iowa, call center. His last day of work was July 2, 2010. The employer released him on a leave pending inquiry or review on that date and discharged him on July 8, 2010. The reason asserted for the discharge was a communication issue between the claimant and his immediate manager.

Prior to his shift on a day about a week prior to July 2, the claimant had gone to his immediate manager to privately advise the manager that there were things of a sexual nature that the manager was saying and doing that the claimant found offensive. The manager responded by telling the claimant, "F - - - you." The claimant then went to the employer's human resources department and complained about the manager's conduct. The employer investigated the claimant's complaint, but placed him on leave on July 2 pending completion of the review. At the conclusion of the investigation on July 8, the employer advised the claimant it had determined it would be best if the claimant's employment be ended.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (lowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The claimant did make his appeal within ten days of actually receiving the decision.

The administrative law judge concludes that the appellant's failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was due to Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2), or other factor outside of the claimant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See Beardslee, supra; Franklin, supra; and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (lowa App. 1990).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.

<u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits, an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission that was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is his expression of concern regarding his manager's conduct. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's August 31, 2010 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The appeal in this case is treated as timely. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw