IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

TISHA M WELLS 3128 – 2ND AVE DES MOINES IA 50313-4434

WAL-MART STORES INC ^C/_o FRICK UC EXPRESS PO BOX 283 ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

Appeal Number:06A-UI-08100-JTTOC:07/09/06R:02Claimant:Respondent(1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.*

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- 1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5(1) - Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Wal-Mart filed a timely appeal from the July 31, 2006, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on August 28, 2006. Customer Service Manager Jerry Shively represented Wal-Mart and presented additional testimony through Assistant Manager Juley Imoehl. Claimant Tisha Wells elected not to participate. Employer's Exhibits One through Two and Four through Seven were received into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the Agency's administrative records regarding benefits disbursed to the claimant.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Tisha Wells was employed by Wal-Mart as a full-time customer service associate from May 5, 2004 until May 3, 2006, when Customer Service Manager Danielle Edmond and members of the management team discharged her for attendance.

The final incident that prompted the discharge occurred on May 2, 2006, when Ms. Wells was absent without properly notifying the employer. The employer's written attendance policy required Ms. Wells to personally notify a member of management at least one hour prior to the scheduled start of her shift if she needed to be absent. Ms. Wells was aware of the policy. Ms. Wells had most recently been absent for something other than illness properly reported to the employer on September 2, 2005.

On February 19, 2005 and September 24, 2005, Ms. Wells received formal reprimands for attendance. Ms. Wells had requested, and the employer had approved, several leaves of absence during the course of the employment.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The question is whether the evidence in the record establishes that Ms. Wells was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment. It does not.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See <u>Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See <u>Crosser v. lowa Dept. of Public Safety</u>, 240 N.W.2d 682 (lowa 1976).

In order for Ms. Wells' absences to constitute misconduct that would disqualify her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, the evidence must establish that her *unexcused* absences were excessive. See 871 IAC 24.32(7). The determination of whether absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. However, the evidence must first establish that the most recent absence that prompted the decision to discharge the employee was unexcused. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation and oversleeping are considered unexcused. On the other hand, absences related to illness are considered excused, provided the employee has complied with the employer's policy regarding notifying the employer of the absence. Tardiness is a form of absence. See <u>Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

The evidence in the record establishes that Ms. Wells' final absence on May 2 was not properly reported to the employer pursuant to the employer's attendance policy and, therefore, was an unexcused absence under the applicable law. However, Ms. Wells' most recent absence for something other than illness properly reported to the employer had been on September 2, 2005, eight months prior to the final absence. Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Ms. Wells' unexcused absences were not excessive. Ms. Wells was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Ms. Wells is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid to Ms. Wells.

DECISION:

The Agency representative's July 31, 2006, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

jt/kjw