IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

STEPHANIE J KIRKPATRICK

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 08A-UI-05932-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

CASEYS MARKETING COMPANY

Employer

OC: 05/18/08 R: 03 Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the June 17, 2008, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on July 14, 2008. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Millie Vroegh, area supervisor.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time manager from October 20, 1998 until May 5, 2008, when she was discharged. On May 2 claimant was supposed to be on vacation but agreed to come in to work and do the books early in the morning since Vroegh could not. Her brakes went out on the way to work and she contacted the store each hour to communicate with Betty Young, Beth Brown, and Gloria Bix. She did arrive sometime during the 10 o'clock hour that morning, and Vroegh told her she did not believe her excuse for being late and told her to go home. This was an isolated incident and claimant had never been warned about attendance before this. Claimant did submit her car repair and rental car bills to employer.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. *Miller v. Employment Appeal Board*, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. lowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (lowa 1984).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. This instance of tardiness, although considered an unexcused absence, was merely an isolated incident, and inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about any of the issues leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The June 17, 2008, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dávon M. Lawis

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/kjw