IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

MELISSA KING Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-14703-ML-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

JELD WEN INC Employer

> OC: 03/21/21 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the June 9, 2021 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that found the claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits due to her discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on August 13, 2021. The claimant, Melissa King, participated personally. The employer, Jeld-Wen Inc., participated through Mark Shaw. The administrative law judge took official notice of the claimant's unemployment insurance benefits records.

Employer's Exhibit A was offered and accepted into the evidentiary record.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a production associate. She was employed from April 25, 2016, until January 28, 2021. Claimant's immediate supervisor was Stan Stewart.

The employer has a written attendance policy and claimant was aware of the policy. Claimant was discharged from employment due to attendance. The final incident leading to discharge occurred on January 27, 2021. Claimant was tardy to work on January 27, 2021, due to weather and transportation issues. She notified her employer that she would be tardy to work; however, she did not call before the start of her shift. Claimant admitted she did not call in prior to the start of her shift; however, she asserts she called in shortly thereafter. The January 27, 2021, tardy put claimant over the employer's attendance points pursuant to its attendance policy.

The employer has the ability to excuse absences and tardies on "snow days." According to claimant, Mr. Stewart initially talked to her about excusing her tardiness on account of the recent snow storm; however, he later told her that corporate decided it was not going to declare a "snow day."

Claimant was absent from work for the first half of her shift on December 3, 2020, due to personal illness. Claimant was at a medical appointment. She notified the employer that she would be absent from work prior to the start of her shift. As a result of this absence, Claimant received a final written warning on December 4, 2020.

Claimant left work early on July 15, 2020, and July 28, 2020. As a result of the July 15, 2020, early out, Claimant received her first written warning on July 22, 2020. Claimant asserts she left work early due to personal illness.

Claimant was absent from work on July 8, 2020, and then tardy to work on July 6, 2020. Claimant asserts these points were pneumonia-related.

Claimant left work early on March 17, 2020, to care for her child. She was awarded a full point because she missed more than half of her shift.

Claimant missed the first half of her shift on February 6, 2020.

Claimant asserts she brought in medical excuses for most of her tardies and/or absences. The employer agreed that claimant brought in medical notes for several of her absences. The employer provided that such absences were not included in her point total.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Unemployment statutes should be interpreted liberally to achieve the legislative goal of minimizing the burden of involuntary unemployment." *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Iowa 1982). The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Id.* at 11. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. *Id.* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Id.* at 558.

Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The

determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not "properly reported." *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982).

The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 190 (Iowa 1984). Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Id.* at 191. Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper*, 321 N.W.2d at 10-11 (Iowa 1982). Absences in good faith, for good cause, with appropriate notice, are not misconduct. *Id.* at 10. They may be grounds for discharge but not for disqualification of benefits because substantial disregard for the employer's interest is not shown and this is essential to a finding of misconduct. *Id.*

Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *See Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable. Two absences would be the minimum amount in order to determine whether these repeated acts were excessive. Further, in the cases of absenteeism it is the law, not the employer's attendance policies, which determines whether absences are excused or unexcused. *Gaborit*, 743 N.W.2d at 557-58 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping is not considered excused. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (lowa 1984). An employer's no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. A properly reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of Iowa Employment Security Law because it is not volitional. Excessive absences are not necessarily unexcused. Absences must be both excessive and unexcused to result in a finding of misconduct.

In this case, the employer has not established that claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. Claimant's last absence/tardy was due to a snow storm. Claimant was not the only employee that was tardy as a result of the snow storm. It appears such tardiness has been excused by the employer in the past, and the employer had the discretion to excuse the tardiness in this instance. Claimant contacted the employer and notified it that she would not be making it to work for the start of her shift as soon as she could. Because her absences were otherwise related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The June 9, 2021 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision denying benefits is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

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Michael J. Lunn Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax (515)478-3528

August 31, 2021 Decision Dated and Mailed

mjl/kmj