

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

HECTOR M VEGA
Claimant

APPEAL NO: 07A-UI-00947-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

ADVANCE SERVICES INC
Employer

OC: 12-03-06 R: 12
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j – Voluntary Leaving – Temporary Employment
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the January 12, 2007, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on February 13, 2007. Claimant participated through interpreter Susan Jaquez. Employer opted not to participate. Department's Exhibit D-1 was received.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant's appeal is timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant received the disqualification decision mailed January 12, 2007 on January 23, 2007 and went to the local office in Texas to file his appeal on January 26, 2007.

Claimant was employed as a temporary employee until October 23, 2006 when the assignment ended. He got his next paycheck and asked for work and there was none.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the claimant's appeal is timely. The administrative law judge determines it is.

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall

determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received in a timely fashion. Without timely notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The claimant filed the appeal within three days of receipt. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The remaining issue is whether claimant quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer. The administrative law judge concludes that he did not.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise

explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

(1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.

(2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of Iowa Code § 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of Iowa Code § 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the claimant is available for work at the conclusion of the temporary assignment. In this case, the employer had notice of the claimant's availability because they notified him of the end of the assignment and he asked for more work, which was not available, when he picked up his last paycheck. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The January 12, 2007, reference 01, decision is reversed. The claimant's appeal is timely and his separation from employment was attributable to the employer. The claimant had adequate

contact with the employer about his availability as required by statute. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs