IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JOY L CASPER

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-06508-DT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MERCY HOSPITAL

Employer

OC: 04/10/11

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Joy L. Casper (claimant) appealed a representative's May 6, 2011 decision (reference 01) that concluded she was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Mercy Hospital (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on June 14, 2011. The claimant participated in the hearing and was represented by Gary Nelson, attorney at law. The employer failed to respond to the hearing notice and provide a telephone number at which a witness or representative could be reached for the hearing and did not participate in the hearing. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer in about October 2006. She worked full-time as a cafeteria float worker on a 5:00 a.m.-to-1:30 p.m. schedule, and working every other weekend. Her last day of work was April 10, 2011. The employer discharged her on April 12, 2011. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

The claimant had been missing work with some frequency in the months preceding April 12, largely due to her husband's illness with cancer. The claimant had exhausted her FMLA (Family Medical Leave) eligibility in January or February. She had received several warnings regarding her attendance, including a two-day suspension in February 2011.

On the evening of April 9, the claimant's husband had been admitted to the hospital for kidney failure, a complication of his cancer, and for which he remained in the hospital for about five days. The claimant was scheduled to work on April 10, and called in prior to her shift to report that due to her husband's hospitalization, she would at least be late. She did come in at about 10:00 a.m. and attempted to work, but because she was still quite upset and emotional due to

her husband being in the hospital, her supervisor agreed that the claimant should leave, which she did after being at work for 30 to 45 minutes.

The claimant was next scheduled to work on April 12, but when she arrived, she was told not to clock in but that she needed to wait and speak with the employer's human resources representative. A meeting was held at about 10:00 a.m., at which time the employer discharged the claimant for her additional absence on April 10.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits, an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission that was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon v. lowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Henry, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; Huntoon, supra; Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Absenteeism can constitute misconduct; however, to be misconduct, absences must be both excessive and unexcused. 871 IAC 24.32(7). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness or medical emergency, such as one that might be covered under FMLA, cannot constitute work-connected misconduct, since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. 871 IAC 24.32(7); Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). Because the final absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred that establishes work-connected misconduct and no disqualification is imposed. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. Cosper, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's May 6, 2011 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/kjw