

administrative file. The record was closed at 10:40 a.m. At 10:50 a.m., the claimant called the Appeals Section and requested that the record be reopened. Based on a review of the information in the administrative file and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES: Should the record be reopened? Was the claimant's appeal timely?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant received the hearing notice on or about October 16, 2005. The instructions inform the parties that if the party does not contact the Appeals Section and provide the phone number at which the party can be contacted for the hearing, the party will not be called for the hearing. The claimant tried calling the Appeals Section several times on October 16 and October 17, but did not get through. After October 17 he had trouble with his phone and did not make further attempts. He resided about a half-mile from the local Agency office but did not go to that office to try to contact the Appeals Section from that office. He did not seek to borrow another telephone and use the toll-free number provided to call the Appeals Section. At the scheduled time for the hearing, he determined to again try to contact the Appeals Section; however, he had misplaced his hearing notice, and so was attempting to call the Agency through the general Agency toll-free number to the Claims Section. By the time he got through to the Claims Section and explained what he needed so that he could be transferred to the Appeals Section, it was 20 minutes after the scheduled start time for the hearing. The claimant had not read all the information on the hearing notice, and had assumed that the Appeals Section would initiate the telephone contact even without a response to the hearing notice.

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on September 22, 2005. No evidence was provided to rebut the presumption that the claimant received the decision within a short time thereafter. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by October 2, 2005. The notice also provided that if the appeal date fell on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the appeal period was extended to the next working day, which in this case was Monday, October 3, 2005. The appeal was not filed until it was hand-delivered to the local Agency office on October 11, 2005, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The claimant stated in his appeal that "I didn't file my appeal previously because I wasn't aware there was a deadline for filing appeals."

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue in this case is whether the claimant's request to reopen the hearing should be granted or denied.

871 IAC 26.14(7) provides:

(7) If a party has not responded to a notice of telephone hearing by providing the appeals section with the names and telephone numbers of its witnesses by the scheduled time of the hearing, the presiding officer may proceed with the hearing.

a. If an absent party responds to the hearing notice while the hearing is in progress, the presiding officer shall pause to admit the party, summarize the hearing to that point, administer the oath, and resume the hearing.

b. If a party responds to the notice of hearing after the record has been closed and any party which has participated is no longer on the telephone line, the presiding officer shall not take the evidence of the late party. Instead, the presiding officer shall inquire as to why the party was late in responding to the notice of hearing. For good cause shown, the presiding officer shall reopen the record and cause further notice of hearing to be issued to all parties of record. The record shall not be reopened if the presiding officer does not find good cause for the party's late response to the notice of hearing.

c. Failure to read or follow the instructions on the notice of hearing shall not constitute good cause for reopening the record.

The first time the claimant successfully called the Appeals Section for the October 27, 2005 hearing was after the hearing had been closed. Although the claimant intended to participate in the hearing, the claimant failed to read or follow the hearing notice instructions and did not contact the Appeals Section prior to the hearing. The rule specifically states that failure to read or follow the instructions on the hearing notice does not constitute good cause to reopen the hearing. The claimant did not establish good cause to reopen the hearing. Therefore, the claimant's request to reopen the hearing is denied.

The determinative issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion.

Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

871 IAC 24.35(2) provides in pertinent part:

The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the department that the delay in submission was due to department error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service or its successor.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2) or other factors outside the appellant's control. The claimant's failure to read and follow the instructions for appeal in the representative's decision does not satisfy this test. The administrative law judge further concludes that because the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6-2, the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal, regardless of whether the merits of the appeal would be valid. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

DECISION:

The September 22, 2005 (reference 03) decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. Benefits are denied.

ld/kjw