

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**LEWO, TITUS, D**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 11A-UI-10497-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**FAWN MANUFACTURING INC**  
Employer

**OC: 07/03/11  
Claimant: Appellant (2)**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct  
Iowa Code Section 96.6(4) – Previously Adjudicated Issue

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the August 4, 2011, reference 02, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on August 31, 2011. Claimant participated. Jamie Badger represented the employer. The hearing in this matter was consolidated with the hearing in Appeal Number 11A-UI-10496-JTT.

**ISSUE:**

Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct in connection with the employment that disqualifies the claimant for unemployment insurance benefits.

Whether the separation was previously adjudicated and that previous adjudication continues to be binding upon the parties.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Titus Lewo was employed by Fawn Manufacturing, Inc., as a full-time press operator from February 16, 2011 until May 20, 2011, when Shift Supervisor Paul Knode discharged him from the employment. During the shift on May 19, 2011, Mr. Lewo had agreed to switch machines with a coworker. The coworker had led Mr. Lewo to believe that Mr. Knode had approved the switch. During the shift, Mr. Knode observed Mr. Lewo operating a machine other than the one to which he had been assigned, but did not say anything to Mr. Lewo about that. The next day, Mr. Lewo was witness to a yelling match between Mr. Knode and the coworker, as Mr. Knode demanded to know whose idea it was to switch machines and the coworker asserted it had been approved by Mr. Knode. Mr. Knode escorted Mr. Lewo and the coworker to the office. The employer did not ask Mr. Lewo much and Mr. Lewo did not offer much. Mr. Lewo is a non-native English speaker. The employer notified Mr. Lewo that he was discharged from employment. There was no other basis for the discharge.

On July 27, 2011, a Workforce Development representative entered a reference 03 decision that denied benefits in connection with the May 20, 2011 separation. On August 4, 2011, a

Workforce Development representative entered a reference 02 decision that again denied benefits based on the May 20, 2011 separation. The latter decision indicated that the separation had been previously adjudicated and that the prior decision remains in effect. The July 27, 2011, reference 03 decision that denied benefits has been reversed upon appeal. See Appeal Number 11A-UI-10496-JTT.

### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in this matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on

which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also Greene v. EAB, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4). When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

Continued failure to follow reasonable instructions constitutes misconduct. See Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa App. 1990). An employee's failure to perform a specific task may not constitute misconduct if such failure is in good faith or for good cause. See Woods v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 327 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa 1982). The administrative law judge must analyze situations involving alleged insubordination by evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's request in light of the circumstances, along with the worker's reason for non-compliance. See Endicott v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).

In Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company, the Iowa Court of Appeals upheld a discharge for misconduct and disqualification for benefits where the claimant had been repeatedly instructed over the course of more than a month to perform a specific task and was part of his assigned duties. The employer reminded the claimant on several occasions to perform the task. The employee refused to perform the task on two separate occasions. On both occasions, the employer discussed with the employee a basis for his refusal. The employer waited until after the employee's second refusal, when the employee still neglected to perform the assigned task, and then discharged employee. See Gilliam v. Atlantic Bottling Company, 453 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa App. 1990).

The employer has presented insufficient evidence to establish misconduct in connection with the employment. The evidence indicates instead that the claimant agreed to switch machines with a coworker to help the coworker out and did so under the belief that the switch had been authorized by the supervisor. There was no intent to act contrary to the interests of the employer. Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Lewo was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, Mr. Lewo is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits paid to Mr. Lewo.

Unless appealed in a timely manner and reversed on appeal, a finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made pursuant to this section by an employee or representative of Iowa Workforce Development, administrative law judge, or the employment appeal board, is binding upon the parties in proceedings brought under this chapter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(3) and (4).

Because the July 27, 2011, reference 03 decision that denied benefits has been reversed upon appeal, it no longer binds the parties and does not bar entry of a decision in this case allowing benefits, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

**DECISION:**

The Agency representative's August 4, 2011, reference 02, decision is reversed. The claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged. There is no prior adjudication that bars the present decision allowing benefits.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/pjs