

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

HANSON GOESO

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 14A-UI-13452-DT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORP

Employer

OC: 11/30/14

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.6-2 – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Hanson Goesos (claimant) appealed a representative's December 12, 2014 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on January 23, 2015. The claimant participated in the hearing and was represented by Brian Ulin, union representative. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded by sending a statement to the Appeals Section indicating that the employer was not going to participate in the hearing. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant's appeal timely or are there legal grounds under which it should be treated as timely? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

OUTCOME:

Reversed. Benefits allowed.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The representative's decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on December 12, 2014. The claimant did not receive the decision until about December 23, 2014. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by December 22, 2014. The appeal was not filed until it was hand-delivered on December 29, 2014, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

The claimant started working for the employer on November 18, 2013. He worked full time on the second shift as a general laborer in production in the employer's meat processing facility.

His last day of work was November 28, 2014. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

The employer has a nine-point attendance policy. As of October 10, 2014 the claimant had seven points; at least four of those points were due to an emergency (fire) or personal illness. The claimant then had another absence on November 25 which was assessed as two points as a no-call, no-show; the claimant had been held in jail due to a domestic dispute. The charges on that matter are still pending as of the date of the hearing.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the claimant timely appealed the representative's decision. Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides that unless the affected party (here, the claimant) files an appeal from the decision within ten calendar days, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied as set out by the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976). Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to rule 871 IAC 24.35(2), or other factor outside of the claimant's control. The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, *Beardslee*, supra; *Franklin*, supra; and *Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board*, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The question is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate matters. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Henry*, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

Excessive unexcused absenteeism can constitute misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(7). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Rule 871 IAC 24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Board*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa App. 2007). Even if the final absence might not have been excused, the employer has not proven that the claimant had excessive unexcused absences. The employer has failed to meet its burden to establish misconduct. *Cosper*, supra. The claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The appeal in this case was timely. The representative's December 12, 2014 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs