

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**THOMAS B HUBBARD**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO: 15A-UI-00052-S2T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**IOWA WORKFORCE  
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT**

**OC: 05/04/14  
Claimant: Appellant (1)**

Section 96.3-5-b – Training Extension Benefits  
Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

Thomas Hubbard (claimant) appealed a representative's December 4, 2014, decision (reference 04) that denied training extension benefits. After a hearing notice was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record, a telephone hearing was held on January 27, 2015. The claimant did participate. Department's Exhibit D-1 was admitted to the record. The claimant offered and Exhibit A was received into evidence.

**ISSUE:**

The issue is whether the appeal was filed in a timely manner.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On November 25, 2014, the claimant applied for Training Extension Benefits because he was separated from employment as a forklift driver/material handler. A worker at IWD asked the claimant to review his address information to see if it was correct. The claimant told the IWD worker his address information was correct but it was not. The claimant moved from that address in August 2014. He made a mistake and did not see the error. A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last-known address of record on December 4, 2014. He did not receive the decision within ten days because of the incorrect address. He notified IWD on December 12, 2014, of his new address. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by December 14, 2014. The appeal was not filed until January 2, 2015, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The claimant as a duty to notify the IWD of his correct address and he did not. His failure to receive the decision was because he did not provide his correct address to the department.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

Had the appeal been considered timely, the request for training extension benefits would have been denied.

Iowa Code § 96.3(5)a-b provides:

a. Duration of benefits. The maximum total amount of benefits payable to an eligible individual during a benefit year shall not exceed the total of the wage credits accrued to the individual's account during the individual's base period, or twenty-six times the individual's weekly benefit amount, whichever is the lesser. The director shall maintain a separate account for each individual who earns wages in insured work. The director shall compute wage credits for each individual by crediting the individual's account with one-third of the wages for insured work paid to the individual during the individual's base period. However, the director shall recompute wage credits for an individual who is laid off due to the individual's employer going out of business at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which the individual was last employed, by crediting the individual's account with one-half, instead of one-third, of the wages for insured work paid to the individual during the individual's base period. Benefits paid to an eligible individual shall be charged against the base period wage credits in the individual's account which have not been previously charged, in the inverse chronological order as the wages on which the wage credits are based were paid. However if the state "off indicator" is in effect and if the individual is laid off due to the individual's employer going out of business at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which the individual was last employed, the maximum benefits payable shall be extended to thirty-nine times the individual's weekly benefit amount, but not to exceed the total of the wage credits accrued to the individual's account.

b. Training Extension Benefits.

(1) An individual who has been separated from a declining occupation or who has been involuntarily separated from employment as a result of a permanent reduction of operations at the last place of employment and who is in training with the approval of the director or in a job training program pursuant to the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, at the time regular benefits are exhausted, may be eligible for training extension benefits.

(2) A declining occupation is one in which there is a lack of sufficient current demand in the individual's labor market area for the occupational skills for which the individual is fitted by training and experience or current physical or mental capacity, and the lack of employment opportunities is expected to continue for an extended period of time, or the individual's occupation is one for which there is a seasonal variation in demand in the labor market and the individual has no other skill for which there is current demand.

(3) The training extension benefit amount shall be twenty-six times the individual's weekly benefit amount and the weekly benefit amount shall be equal to the individual's weekly benefit amount for the claim in which benefits were exhausted while in training.

(4) An individual who is receiving training extension benefits shall not be denied benefits due to application of § 96.4, subsection 3, or § 96.5, subsection 3. However, an employer's account shall not be charged with benefits so paid. Relief of charges under this paragraph "b" applies to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding § 96.8, subsection 5.

(5) In order for the individual to be eligible for training extension benefits, all of the following criteria must be met:

(a) The training must be for a high-demand occupation or high-technology occupation, including the fields of life sciences, advanced manufacturing, biotechnology, alternative fuels, insurance, and environmental technology. "High-demand occupation" means an occupation in a labor market area in which the department determines work opportunities are available and there is a lack of qualified applicants.

(b) The individual must file any unemployment insurance claim to which the individual becomes entitled under state or federal law, and must draw any unemployment insurance benefits on that claim until the claim has expired or has been exhausted, in order to maintain the individual's eligibility under this paragraph "b". Training extension benefits end upon completion of the training even though a portion of the training extension benefit amount may remain.

(c) The individual must be enrolled and making satisfactory progress to complete the training.

For an individual to be eligible to receive training extension benefits the individual must be separated from employment in a declining occupation, involuntarily separated due to permanent reductions, or separated from a seasonal occupation. The claimant does not meet these requirements. Therefore, the claimant's request for training extension benefits is denied.

**DECISION:**

The December 4, 2014, reference 04, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. The claimant's request for training extension benefits is denied.

---

Beth A. Scheetz  
Administrative Law Judge

---

Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/pjs