IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

 68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - El

 DANG O NYKIEW

 Claimant

 APPEAL NO: 10A-UI-09315-DT

 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

 DECISION

 TYSON FRESH MEATS INC

 Employer

OC: 05/09/10 Claimant: Respondent (1)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's June 18, 2010 decision (reference 01) that concluded Dang O. Nykiew (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 25, 2010. The claimant participated in the hearing. Will Sager appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on October 5, 2009. He worked full time as a second shift production worker at the employer's Storm Lake, Iowa pork processing facility. His last day of work was May 11, 2010.

On May 6, after working slightly over three hours, the claimant was working on the line when he began to feel dizzy, could not see, and nearly lost his balance. He advised his supervisor he was not feeling well, and was allowed to go to the nurse's station. When the claimant got to the nurse's station, the nurse did check the claimant's vitals, but could not detect anything wrong, and so told the claimant he should report back to his work station. The claimant continued to state that he did not feel well enough to work, so he went and sat in the cafeteria. The claimant's supervisor found him there and instructed him to return to work since the nurse had found nothing wrong. The claimant repeated to the supervisor that he did not feel well enough to work. The supervisor told the claimant to return to the line within ten minutes or he would not have a job. As the claimant continued to feel he was not able to work, he left the facility rather than returning to the line.

On May 7 the claimant called in an absence due to illness and went to see a doctor. The doctor indicated that the claimant might have a heart problem, and gave the claimant a monitor to wear. The claimant attempted to return to work on May 10, but was sent home due to the employer's conclusion he had walked off work without permission on May 6. When he was brought in for a further meeting on May 11, he was told he no longer had a job because he had walked off work without permission.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A claimant is not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if he quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer or was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code §§ 96.5-1; 96.5-2-a.

Rule 871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship and an action to carry out that intent. <u>Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993); <u>Wills v. Employment Appeal Board</u>, 447 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1989). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that he quit by job abandonment by walking off the job without permission on May 6. While the claimant may not have had permission to leave on May 6, the employer may have felt it had a valid reason for denying the claimant permission to leave, it has not established that the claimant's reason for seeking to leave was false and that the claimant left simply in defiance of the instruction to return to work. The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily quit. Iowa Code § 96.6-2. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The issue in this case is then whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); <u>Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of

the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Henry</u>, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; <u>Huntoon</u>, supra; <u>Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was his leaving work on May 6 without permission because of his asserted illness. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. <u>Cosper</u>, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's June 18, 2010 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

Lynette A. F. Donner Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/pjs