IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

MATTHEW P TALLEY

Claimant

APPEAL NO: 19A-UI-04711-JC-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

DECISION

SAFELITE SOLUTIONS LLC

Employer

OC: 05/12/19

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Admin, Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 - Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the May 31, 2019, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on July 5, 2019. The claimant did not respond to the notice of hearing to furnish a phone number with the Appeals Bureau and did not participate in the hearing. The employer participated through Trenton Kilpatrick, hearing representative. Ashley Toney and Laura Payne testified.

The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a quality assurance associate and was separated from employment on May 14, 2019, when he was discharged for excessive absenteeism.

When the claimant was hired in 2016, he was trained on employer rules and procedure and signed an acknowledgment that he had been trained. The employer's rules and procedures included its attendance policy which provides an employee will be discharged upon receipt of 9 occurrences in a rolling 12 month period. The employer's policy stated it will consolidate certain

absences to reduce occurrences (such as an employee being sick two consecutive days will only be considered one occurrence) and apply progressive discipline before discharge. The employer's policy also stated employees must call the designated phone line to report an absence.

The undisputed evidence is the claimant received multiple warnings for his attendance during his employment including October 6, 2017, November 10, 2017, January 22, 2018, June 7, 2018, October 11, 2018, February 1, 2019 and a final warning on February 11, 2019. The employer reported the final 9 occurrences as follows:

August 31, 2018	1 occurrence
October 22-25, 2018	1 occurrence
December 4, 2018	1 occurrence
December 13-14, 2018	1 occurrence
January 7-12, 2019	1 occurrence
January 18-24, 2019	1 occurrence
January 25-26, 2019	1 occurrence
February 4-8, 2019	1 occurrence
May 2-3, 2019	1 occurrence

The reasons for absences varied, including multiple car or tire issues. The final absences on May 2 and May 3, 2019 were due to a toothache and properly reported to the employer. The claimant was subsequently discharged.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$1,955.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of May 12, 2019. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview or make a witness with direct knowledge available for rebuttal.

Stephanie Festog, claims analyst for Corporate Cost Control, the employer's unemployment vendor, was called and a voicemail was provided for her. She did not respond. There is no evidence that the employer attempted to submit written participation in lieu of attending the fact-finding interview. Ms. Festog did not attend the hearing to explain why she did not respond to the call or voicemail for the fact-finding interview. Neither employer witness had information available about Ms. Festog's non-participation.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

lowa unemployment insurance law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. lowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. Id. In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. Id. Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

In the specific context of absenteeism the administrative code provides:

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

871 IAC 24.32(7); See Higgins v. IDJS, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190 n. 1 (lowa 1984)("rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law").

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. *Iowa Admin. Code* r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there has been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

In this case, the claimant had a history of attendance occurrences, several of which were due to personal issues such as transportation. Those absences would be considered unexcused for purposes of determining unemployment insurance eligibility. His final two absences on May 2 and May 3, 2019 were properly reported and due to a toothache. Therefore, the final absence was due to illness and properly reported, would be considered excused.

Iowa Admin. Code r.871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes the employer has not established that the claimant had excessive absences which would be considered unexcused for purposes of unemployment insurance eligibility. Because the last absence was related to properly reported illness or other reasonable grounds, no final or current incident of unexcused absenteeism occurred which establishes work-connected misconduct. Since the employer has not established a current or final act of misconduct, and, without such, the history of other incidents need not be examined. Accordingly, benefits are allowed.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading to separation was misconduct under lowa law.

Because the claimant is eligible for benefits, the issues of overpayment and relief of charges are moot.

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DECISION:

The May 31, 2019,	(reference 01) decision	n is affirmed.	The claimant was	discharged	for no
disqualifying reason.	Benefits are allowed,	provided he is	otherwise eligible.		

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn