IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

APPEAL NO. 08A-UI-10417-LT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION

OC: 10/05/08 R: 04

MATHEW J PEIRCE

Claimant

HNI SERVICES LLC

Employer

Claimant: Respondent (1)

lowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the October 28, 2008, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on November 20, 2008. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Julie Beinke.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was hired as a full-time computer operator and worked from June 13, 2000 until June 23, 2008 when he was discharged. On June 22 Mark Maine, IT infrastructure manager, second level supervisor, and Tom Burns, technical supervisor, e-mailed Beinke to report that claimant was working third shift and was to monitor jobs that were running. On an unspecified date a job aborted so employer investigated and Jeff Caine and Scott Schmelzer who said he had been sleeping almost every night for an hour but did not provide any dates or details and did not confront claimant. Claimant worked from 11 p.m. on June 22 to 9 a.m. on June 23 but Caine and Schmelzer did not work during those hours. The time frame to resolve aborted programs varies widely. He had been warned for arriving late and allegedly sleeping on the job in February 2006 and tardiness in January 2007. He did not sleep on the job after the warning.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa App. 1988). When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. Schmitz v. IDHS, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. Schmitz, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer has not provided sufficient detail of the allegations to adequately rebut claimant's denial of the hearsay evidence, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The October 28, 2008, reference 01, decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs