

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

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**COLLEEN M MILLER**

Claimant

**APPEAL 16A-UI-13598-LJ-T**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**KINSETH HOTEL CORPORATION**

Employer

**OC: 11/20/16**

**Claimant: Respondent (2)**

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Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed an appeal from the December 15, 2016, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits based upon a determination that claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on February 1, 2017. The claimant, Colleen M. Miller, participated. The employer, Kinseth Hotel Corporation, participated through Melissa Carr, general manager; Gloria Her (not on January 25 hearing), claims representative for Employers Unity, L.L.C.; and Todd Richardson of Employer's Unity represented the employer. Claimant's Exhibits A through U and Employer's Exhibits 1 through 24 were received and admitted into the record.

**ISSUES:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can charges to the employer's account be waived?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed part time, most recently as a housekeeper, from August 17, 2015, until December 6, 2016, when she was discharged for absenteeism. Claimant's final absence occurred on Wednesday, November 30, 2016. Claimant had messaged the employer the day before to state that her daughter had a doctor's appointment in Iowa City and she would not be able to work. Claimant did not submit a time-off request to Carr and request to be absent that day, though she had followed this procedure in the past. Claimant testified that this was a "last-minute" appointment. Carr disputes that this was an emergency appointment, as claimant provided her with a letter showing she knew about the appointment as early as November 16, 2016. (Exhibit 11 (date not discernible in ALJ's exhibit)) Claimant also testified that she did not

believe she had to work on November 30, as she had texted Jenny Dye on Monday about her schedule and Dye initially stated claimant worked Thursday and Sunday. (Exhibit 21) Dye corrected herself the following day and stated claimant was scheduled for Wednesday and Sunday. (Exhibit 21) Carr testified that the schedule had been posted since the Thursday prior to these events.

Claimant received several prior warnings due to her attendance. On April 6, 2016, Carr issued claimant a suspension and final warning. (Exhibit 6) According to this document, claimant notified the employer twenty-five minutes prior to her shift on March 30 that she would not be in because she had family issues. Claimant testified this issue had to do with her daughter not having school and her daughter's father unexpectedly not being able to watch the daughter. On October 10, claimant received a suspension and final warning. (Exhibit 4) According to this document, claimant called in and reported that her daughter did not have school unexpectedly. The parties agree that October 10 was the day after a severe storm and tornado hit claimant's geographical area. Claimant testified she initially thought her daughter did not have school, but she ended up having school. However, according to claimant, there was so much debris in the road after the storm that claimant could not get to work. Carr testified that she lives in claimant's neighborhood and was able to make it to work. Claimant was aware her job was in jeopardy for attendance issues.

The administrative record reflects that claimant has received unemployment benefits in the amount of \$782.00, since filing a claim with an effective date of November 20, 2016, for the ten weeks ending January 28, 2017. The administrative record also establishes that the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview through the testimony of Gloria Her and supporting documentation.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment due to excessive, unexcused absenteeism. Benefits are withheld.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up

to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law."

The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The determination in this case rests in part on the credibility of the parties. It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

After assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the employer's version of events more credible than claimant's version of events. The administrative law judge does not believe that claimant ever asked to not be scheduled on November 30. Claimant's contention that this was a last-minute appointment is unconvincing. Additionally, even if claimant was called with the opportunity to take someone else's canceled appointment, such an opportunity would not alleviate her responsibility to report to work as scheduled and clear absences with her employer. Claimant's version of events regarding October 10 was similarly unconvincing, particularly given that Carr lived in claimant's neighborhood and was able to make it to work.

An employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. The employer has established that the claimant was warned that further improperly reported or unexcused absences could result in termination of employment. Claimant was given multiple opportunities to improve her attendance, and she failed to do this. Claimant's final absence was not properly reported or

excused. The final absence, in combination with the claimant's two other unexcused absences on March 30 and October 10, is considered excessive. Benefits are withheld.

The next issues are whether claimant was overpaid benefits, whether claimant must repay benefits, and whether the employer may be charged. Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b, as amended in 2008, provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if un rebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony

at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)"b" as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant's separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award

benefits on an issue regarding the claimant's employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The employer will not be charged for benefits if it is determined that they did participate in the fact-finding interview. Iowa Code § 96.3(7), Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10. In this case, the claimant has received benefits but was not eligible for those benefits. Since the employer did participate in the fact-finding interview the claimant is obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received and the employer's account shall not be charged.

**DECISION:**

The December 15, 2016, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$782.00 and is obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer did participate in the fact-finding interview and its account shall not be charged.

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Elizabeth A. Johnson  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

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