

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

CHRISTOPHER B MANNING
Claimant

MENS WEARHOUSE
Employer

APPEAL 20A-UI-02292-S1-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

**OC: 08/11/19
Claimant: Appellant (1/R)**

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal
Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.5-1 - Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Christopher Manning (claimant) appealed a representative's March 2, 2020, decision (reference 03) that concluded ineligibility to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from work with Mens Wearhouse (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 18, 2020. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Gerry Moore, Regional Manager.

Exhibit D-1 was received into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative file.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether the appeal was filed in a timely manner.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on March 2, 2020. The decision arrived in the claimant's home approximately between March 11 and 13, 2020. The claimant, his wife, or children generally bring mail into the home and place it in a mail rack. The claimant found it in the mail rack on or about May 13, 2020. It may have been there for one or two days. The claimant opened and read the decision on or about March 13, 2020. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by March 12, 2020. The claimant was upset and disgusted by the decision. He put it down and tried to forget it. Later, on March 16, 2020, the claimant filed an appeal to the decision. The appeal letter did not mention the delay.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the claimant may not have received the decision within ten days of the mailing date. The claimant was not sure of the date of receipt or the date of opening of the decision. After discovering and reading the decision, the claimant took additional days to file the appeal. He did not take immediate action to meet the deadline. His appeal letter did not address the issue of his delay.

The administrative law judge concludes that the failure to file a timely appeal after receiving notice of the decision was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).


The issue of whether claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits and federal pandemic unemployment compensation is remanded to the Benefits Bureau of Iowa Workforce Development for an initial investigation and decision.

Note to Claimant: This decision determines you are not eligible for regular unemployment insurance benefits. If you disagree with this decision you may file an appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by following the instructions on the first page of this decision. Individuals who do not qualify for regular unemployment insurance benefits due to disqualifying separations, but who are currently unemployed for reasons related to COVID-19 may qualify for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). **You will need to apply for PUA to determine your eligibility under the program.** Additional information on how to apply for PUA can be found at <https://www.iowaworkforcedevelopment.gov/pua-information>.

DECISION:

The March 2, 2020, (reference 03), decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. The claimant is not eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

The issue of whether claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits and federal pandemic unemployment compensation is remanded to the Benefits Bureau of Iowa Workforce Development for an initial investigation and decision.



Beth A. Scheetz
Administrative Law Judge

May 26, 2020
Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/mh