

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

ALEXA I N MARLEY
Claimant

FOCUS SERVICES LLC
Employer

APPEAL 20A-UI-09752-AD-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

**OC: 04/12/20
Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)A – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On August 10, 2020, Focus Services LLC (employer/appellant) filed an appeal from the July 31, 2020 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits based on a finding claimant was dismissed from work on December 15, 2019 with no showing of misconduct.

A telephone hearing was held on September 29, 2020. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. Employer participated by Culture and HR Assistant Jessi Flint and was represented by Cheryl Valens. Alexa Marley (claimant/respondent) participated personally.

Official notice was taken of claimant's payment history on the unemployment insurance system.

ISSUE(S):

- I. Was the separation a layoff, discharge for misconduct, or voluntary quit without good cause?
- II. Was the claimant overpaid benefits? Should claimant repay benefits or should employer be charged due to employer participation in fact finding?
- III. Is the claimant eligible for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

Claimant worked for employer as a full-time agent in training. Claimant's first day of employment was December 2, 2019. The last day claimant worked on the job was December 15, 2019. Claimant's immediate supervisor was Amy Escalante. Claimant separated from employment on December 15, 2019. Claimant was discharged on that date by Escalante.

Contemporaneous documentation completed by Escalante shows claimant was discharged due to attendance. Claimant missed two days due to illness on December 8 and 10, 2020. Claimant

reported these absences to Escalante. Employer requires employees to have 100 percent attendance during training. Claimant was aware of this policy.

Escalante is no longer working for the company and so was unavailable to personally provide testimony. Employer is unaware of issues between claimant and any coworkers. None were recorded in her employee file.

The question to be addressed is whether claimant was discharged for a current act of substantial, job-related misconduct. Therefore, any incidents that may have occurred after claimant was discharged are irrelevant in determining whether she is disqualified from benefits and were not taken into account in this decision.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons set forth below, the July 31, 2020 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits is AFFIRMED.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32 provides in relevant part:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The employer bears the burden of proving that a claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of substantial misconduct within the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(2). *Myers v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 462 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman, Id.* In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. *Newman, Id.*

When reviewing an alleged act of misconduct, the finder of fact may consider past acts of misconduct to determine the magnitude of the current act. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). However, conduct asserted to be disqualifying misconduct must be both specific and current. *West v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 489 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1992); *Greene v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Because our unemployment compensation law is designed to protect workers from financial hardships when they become unemployed through no fault of their own, we construe the provisions "liberally to carry out its humane and beneficial purpose." *Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 570 N.W.2d 85, 96 (Iowa 1997). "[C]ode provisions which operate to work a forfeiture of benefits are strongly construed in favor of the claimant." *Diggs v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 478 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).

In order to show misconduct due to absenteeism, the employer must establish the claimant had excessive absences that were unexcused. Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). A determination as to whether an absence is excused or unexcused does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's attendance policy. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper, supra; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility

such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the absences were unexcused. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness are excused, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871- 24.32(7); *Cosper, supra*; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit, supra*. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins, supra*. However, a good faith inability to obtain childcare for a sick infant may be excused. *McCourtney v. Imprimis Tech., Inc.*, 465 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).

The second step in the analysis is to determine whether the unexcused absences were excessive. Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. *Higgins*, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); *Armel v. EAB*, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); *Hiland v. EAB*, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and *Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982). Excessiveness by its definition implies an amount or degree too great to be reasonable or acceptable.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge, as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

The administrative law judge did not find claimant's testimony to be reliable. Claimant testified that Escalante gave her varying reasons for her discharge. Claimant testified that Escalante told her at the time of discharge that she was being discharged because claimant and a coworker named Morgan could not both work there due to a prior disagreement between the two. Claimant testified Escalante later testified that she was discharged because she was simply not a good fit for the job. Claimant indicated she had text messages from Escalante to this effect. However, she did not provide them as proposed exhibits for the hearing and could not explain why Escalante would provide widely differing explanations for her discharge. The administrative law judge finds more reliable the contemporaneous documentation prepared by Escalante at the time of claimant's discharge and which was relied on by Flint in providing testimony. Factual disputes were resolved accordingly.

Employer has not carried its burden of proving claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits because of a current act of substantial misconduct within the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(2). Claimant was discharged by Escalante due to absenteeism. However, claimant's absences were reported to Escalante and were due to illness. These absences were not excessive, as there were just two of them. As the absences were properly reported, were due to illness, and were not excessive, they do not constitute substantial job-related misconduct such that claimant is disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The July 31, 2020 (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits is **AFFIRMED**. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.



Andrew B. Duffelmeyer
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September 30, 2020
Decision Dated and Mailed

abd/scn