

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

JENNIFER STRONG

Claimant

APPEAL 18A-UI-10368-NM-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

WAPELLO COUNTY AUDITOR

Employer

OC: 09/23/18

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the October 11, 2018, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 30, 2018. Claimant participated and testified. Employer participated through Wapello County Auditor Kelly Spurgeon. Claimant's Exhibit A was received into evidence.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant began working for employer on March 19, 2018. Claimant last worked as a full-time clerk 1. Claimant was separated from employment on April 3, 2018, when she was discharged.

When claimant was hired she was subject to a 120 day probationary period. Within the first two weeks of her employment, the employer had concerns claimant would not be able to meet performance expectations. Spurgeon heard of one incident where claimant was complaining about the menial nature of the work she was assigned to do, allegedly in a derogatory manner. Approximately one week prior to her separation claimant was expected to attend training on new voting equipment. Claimant asked another staff member why she was required to go to the training. It was explained all staff were required to go, so claimant went. Claimant had her phone out throughout the training, though no one told her this was a problem or to put the phone away.

Prior to the training claimant had requested to leave early for lunch so she could attend a program at her child's school. Claimant understood her request to include taking a longer than normal lunch, without pay. Spurgeon did not understand claimant was requesting more than the normal 30 minute lunch, but thought she was just requesting to take her break early. One week later it was determined that claimant's employment was not going to work out and she was discharged. Claimant had no prior disciplinary action and was not advised her job was in jeopardy prior to her separation.

The claimant filed a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits with an effective date of September 23, 2018. The claimant filed for and received a total of \$1,890.00 in unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks between September 23 and October 27, 2018. Both the employer and the claimant participated in a fact finding interview regarding the separation on October 10, 2018. The fact finder determined claimant qualified for benefits.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). Misconduct must be "substantial" to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. *Newman v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(5) provides:

(5) Trial period. A dismissal, because of being physically unable to do the work, being not capable of doing the work assigned, not meeting the employer's standards, or having been hired on a trial period of employment and not being able to do the work shall not be issues of misconduct.

Discharge within a probationary period, without more, is not disqualifying. Failure in job performance due to inability or incapacity is not considered misconduct because the actions were not volitional. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979). Where an individual is discharged due to a failure in job performance, proof of that individual's ability to do the job is required to justify disqualification, rather than accepting the employer's subjective view. To do so is to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the claimant. *Kelly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 386 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). Since the employer agreed that claimant had never had a sustained period of time during which she performed her job duties to employer's satisfaction and inasmuch as she did attempt to perform the job to the best of her ability but was unable to meet its expectations, no intentional misconduct has been established, as is the employer's burden of proof. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Furthermore, an employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Training or general notice to staff about a policy is not considered a disciplinary warning. Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. Accordingly, no disqualification pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a is imposed. As benefits are allowed, the issues of overpayment and participation are moot.

DECISION:

The October 11, 2018, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid. The issues of overpayment and participation are moot.

Nicole Merrill
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/rvs