

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

BAMBI COX
Claimant

APPEAL NO: 12A-UI-11565-DT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

L A LEASING INC/SEDONA STAFFING
Employer

OC: 09/02/12

Claimant: Respondent (1/R)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.5-1-j – Temporary Employment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

L A Leasing, Inc. / Sedona Staffing (employer) appealed a representative's September 21, 2012 decision (reference 01) that concluded Bambi Cox (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 22, 2012. The claimant participated in the hearing. Maria Mays appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, James Cole. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The employer is a temporary employment firm. The claimant began taking assignments with the employer on September 27, 2011. Her final assignment began on July 2, 2012. Her last day on the assignment was August 31, 2012. The assignment ended because the employer's business client determined to end it because of an incident involving a line leader.

The employer provided second-hand testimony to the effect that the claimant had told the line leader to "shut your mouth or I'm going to smack you." The claimant denied making this statement, testifying that what she did say was "If you have something to say, say it to my face, not behind my back." Because of the belief that the claimant had made a threat against the line leader, the business client determined to end the assignment. The employer informed the claimant of the ending of the assignment on September 3.

The claimant has not actively sought reassignment with the employer because she had been told that there was no other work available for her in the immediate vicinity in Iowa City near the claimant's residence. The claimant is not willing to accept assignments outside of that area,

even in nearby Coralville, because of family responsibilities. She had informed the employer of her limitations, and the employer did not have any other work currently within the area in which the claimant was willing to accept assignments.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The essential question in this case is whether employer's business client effectively discharged the claimant from her assignment for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer or client was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. *Cosper v. IDJS*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

In order to establish misconduct such as to disqualify a former employee from benefits an employer must establish the employee was responsible for a deliberate act or omission which was a material breach of the duties and obligations owed by the employee to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1979); *Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The conduct must show a willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Henry*, supra. In contrast, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. 871 IAC 24.32(1)a; *Huntoon*, supra; *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

The reason cited by the employer or its business client for ending the claimant's assignment is the alleged threat against the line leader. The employer relies exclusively on second-hand information; however, without that information being provided first-hand, the administrative law judge is unable to ascertain whether the persons to whom the employer's witness spoke might have been mistaken, whether they actually observed the entire time, whether they are credible, or whether the employer's witness might have misinterpreted or misunderstood aspects of their reports. Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant in fact made an actual threat to the line leader. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. *Cosper*, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

The second subissue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit by failing to affirmatively pursue reassignment. An employee of a temporary employment firm who has been given proper notice of the requirement can be deemed to have voluntarily quit her employment with the employer if she fails to contact the employer within three business days of the ending of the assignment in order to notify the employer of the ending of the assignment and to seek reassignment. Iowa Code § 96.5-1-j. The intent of the statute is to avoid situations where a temporary assignment has ended and the claimant is unemployed, but the employer is unaware that the claimant is not working could have been offered an available new assignment to avoid any liability for unemployment insurance benefits.

Where a temporary employment assignment has ended by the completion of the assignment of and the employer is aware of the ending of that assignment, the employer is already on “notice” that the assignment is ended and the claimant is available for a new assignment; where the claimant knows that the employer is aware of the ending of the assignment, she has good cause for not separately “notifying” the employer. 871 IAC 24.26(15).

Here, the employer was aware that the business client had ended the assignment; it considered the claimant's assignment to have been completed, albeit unsatisfactorily. The employer was already on notice that the claimant was only willing to consider assignments in a limited geographic area, in which it did not have any other work currently available. Regardless of whether the claimant continued to seek a new assignment, the separation itself is deemed to be completion of temporary assignment and not a voluntary leaving; a refusal of an offer of a new assignment would be a separate potentially disqualifying issue. Benefits are allowed, if the claimant is otherwise eligible.

An issue as to whether the claimant's restrictions on the area in which she is willing to accept work are unreasonably restrictive arose during the hearing. This issue was not included in the notice of hearing for this case, and the case will be remanded for an investigation and preliminary determination on that issue. 871 IAC 26.14(5).

DECISION:

The representative's September 21, 2012 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible. The matter is remanded to the Claims Section for investigation and determination of the able and available for work issue.

Lynette A. F. Donner
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

ld/css