IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

CLINT W WERKMEISTER Claimant

APPEAL NO. 17A-UI-01212-TNT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ADVANCE SERVICES INC

Employer

OC: 09/04/16 Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeals Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Clint W. Werkmeister, the claimant, filed an appeal from a representative's decision dated January 20, 2017, reference 10, which denied unemployment insurance benefits, finding that the claimant voluntarily quit work for personal reasons that were not caused by the employer. After due notice was provided, a telephone conference hearing was held on February 22, 2017. The claimant participated (but disconnected prior to the end of the hearing). The employer participated by Ms. Milissa Lewein, Risk Manager. Employer's Exhibits A and B were admitted into the hearing record.

ISSUE:

At issue in this matter is whether the appeal filed herein was timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having considered all of the evidence in the record, finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on January 20, 2017. The decision was received at the claimant's address of record and contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Bureau by January 30, 2017. It is the claimant's belief that the decision may have been delayed in arriving at his address of record in Council Bluffs, Iowa, because he had recently moved from place to place, and at times did not have a permanent mailing address. Mr. Werkmeister began living at address 4006 Ave. E, Apt. #1, Council Bluffs, Iowa 51501 in mid-December 2016, and had entered a change of address at that time. After receiving the adjudicator's decision. Mr. Werkmeister did not immediately read it because he was busy and engaged in attempting to find new employment. After he noted the due date on the decision, the claimant waited "one or two days" before going to the local area claims center and filed his appeal on February 1, 2017, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision.

Mr. Werkmeister was employed by Advance Services, Inc. from November 21, 2016 until December 6, 2016, when he quit his part-time assignment at PepsiCo. Bottling Company in

Carol, Iowa, because he had been evicted from his living quarters with his girlfriend the previous night. Work continued to be available to the claimant at the time of his leaving.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disgualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disgualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. *Messina v. IDJS*, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott* 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion.

Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6-2, and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The representative's decision dated January 20, 2017, reference 10, is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

Terry Nice Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

rvs/rvs