IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

JAMIE R GUSTAFSON Claimant

APPEAL 18A-UI-02956-JCT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ROSENBOOM MACHINE & TOOL INC Employer

> OC: 12/10/17 Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

Iowa Code § 96.4(3) – Ability to and Availability for Work

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.22(2) - Able & Available - Benefits Eligibility Conditions

Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant, Jamie R. Gustafson, filed an appeal from the December 28, 2017, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 4, 2018. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Craig Van Drunen, human resources generalist. Knut Brown, manager, also testified. Department Exhibit D-1 was admitted. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely? Is the claimant able to work and available for work effective December 10, 2017? Did the claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to the employer?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a welder beginning in 2014 and was separated from employment on October 18, 2017, when he quit. Continuing work was available.

The claimant stated he quit because he was in physical pain and could hardly get out of bed. The claimant did not present documentation to the employer or for the hearing that his treating physician advised him to quit employment. The claimant has a history of blood pressure and issues resulting in varicose vein surgery in 2017. The claimant stated he also struggled to breathe and his nose would hurt due to circulation issues. The claimant worked under the same work issues, in the same work space for over three years. The claimant did not request any accommodation or restriction before quitting. The claimant stated he continues to be under

medical care but denied restrictions. He stated he plans to work shorter days to stay off his feet.

An initial unemployment insurance decision (Reference 01) resulting in disqualification was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on December 28, 2017. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Bureau by January 7, 2018. Because the last day to appeal was a Sunday, the deadline was extended to Monday, January 8, 2018. The appeal was not filed until March 5, 2018, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. The claimant has his mail sent to his parent's house, where he said he visits daily to drop off his dogs. The claimant stated if there is mail for him, that it is left on a table. The claimant denied receipt of the decision but said he participated in the fact-finding interview and knew a decision was forthcoming.

The claimant delayed visiting his local Spencer IWD office until March 5, 2018, to inquire about the decision and file his appeal because he was busy tending to his father in the hospital in January, and said he had tried calling in February but would be on hold for extended periods of time. The claimant stated his father was in the hospital for several weeks in January 2018 and he could not sit on hold and call IWD repeatedly to inquire about why he had not received a decision. He stated he had been on hold when he would call for 30 minutes at a time. The claimant had no other details about contact or attempts to contact IWD for the decision. He filed his appeal on March 5, 2018 (Department Exhibit D-1).

Since separation, the claimant has searched for full-time work, in shorter shifts, in manufacturing settings. He was with his father at the hospital for five to six hours per day for a period in January 2018, but maintains he was searching for jobs during that time, even though he was unable while at the hospital to contact IWD to inquire about the status of his unemployment/initial decision.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant's appeal is timely.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disgualification shall be The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic imposed. eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the

representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (lowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). It is unclear why the claimant would delay visiting his IWD office or following up with IWD for all of January and February 2018, if he was awaiting the decision (or potential unemployment insurance benefits). However, the claimant stated he first received notice of the unfavorable decision when visiting the Spencer office on March 5, 2018, and filed his appeal the same day. Since this was the first notice of disqualification, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

The next issue is whether the claimant is able to and available for work. For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant is able to work and available for work.

Iowa Code § 96.4(3) provides:

An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the department finds that:

3. The individual is able to work, is available for work, and is earnestly and actively seeking work. This subsection is waived if the individual is deemed partially unemployed, while employed at the individual's regular job, as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "b", unnumbered paragraph (1), or temporarily unemployed as defined in section 96.19, subsection 38, paragraph "c". The work search requirements of this subsection and the disqualification requirement for failure to apply for, or to accept suitable work of section 96.5, subsection 3 are waived if the individual is not disqualified for benefits under section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraph "h".

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.22(2) provides:

Benefits eligibility conditions. For an individual to be eligible to receive benefits the department must find that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly

and actively seeking work. The individual bears the burden of establishing that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work.

(2) Available for work. The availability requirement is satisfied when an individual is willing, able, and ready to accept suitable work which the individual does not have good cause to refuse, that is, the individual is genuinely attached to the labor market. Since, under unemployment insurance laws, it is the availability of an individual that is required to be tested, the labor market must be described in terms of the individual. A labor market for an individual means a market for the type of service which the individual offers in the geographical area in which the individual offers the service. Market in that sense does not mean that job vacancies must exist; the purpose of unemployment insurance is to compensate for lack of job vacancies. It means only that the type of services which an individual is offering is generally performed in the geographical area in which the individual performed in the geographical area in which the individual performed in the geographical area in which the individual performed in the geographical area in which the individual performed in the geographical area in which the individual performed in the geographical area in which the individual is offering the services.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.22(1)a provides:

Benefits eligibility conditions. For an individual to be eligible to receive benefits the department must find that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work. The individual bears the burden of establishing that the individual is able to work, available for work, and earnestly and actively seeking work.

(1) Able to work. An individual must be physically and mentally able to work in some gainful employment, not necessarily in the individual's customary occupation, but which is engaged in by others as a means of livelihood.

a. Illness, injury or pregnancy. Each case is decided upon an individual basis, recognizing that various work opportunities present different physical requirements. A statement from a medical practitioner is considered prima facie evidence of the physical ability of the individual to perform the work required. A pregnant individual must meet the same criteria for determining ableness as do all other individuals.

The undisputed evidence is the claimant has no medical restriction or other limitation on his employability effective December 10, 2017. The claimant has stated he can perform full-time work, even with his existing medical issues. Accordingly, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant meets the availability requirements.

The final issue is whether the claimant quit the employment with good cause attributable to the employer.

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. Arndt v. City of LeClaire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Holtz, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. Id.. In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. Id. After assessing the credibility of the claimant who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using her own common sense and experience, the administrative law judge finds the weight of the evidence in the record establishes claimant has not met his burden of proof to establish he guit for good cause reasons within Iowa law.

The claimant voluntarily quit his employment without notice on October 18, 2017. As such, the claimant has the burden of proving that the voluntary leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code § 96.6(2). "Good cause" for leaving employment must be that which is reasonable to the average person, not the overly sensitive individual or the claimant in particular. *Uniweld Products v. Indus. Relations Comm'n*, 277 So.2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). A notice of intent to quit for reasons other than work-related health problems is not required. *Hy-Vee, Inc.,710 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2005)*. In 1995, the Iowa Administrative Code was amended to include an intent-to- quit requirement added to rule 871-24.26(6)(b), the provision addressing work-related health problems. *Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 710 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2005)*.

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disgualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(6)b provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(6) Separation because of illness, injury, or pregnancy.

b. Employment related separation. The claimant was compelled to leave employment because of an illness, injury, or allergy condition that was attributable to the employment. Factors and circumstances directly connected with the employment which caused or aggravated the illness, injury, allergy, or disease to the employee which made it impossible for the employee to continue in employment because of serious danger to the employee's health may be held to be an involuntary termination of employment and constitute good cause attributable to the employer. The claimant will be eligible for benefits if compelled to leave employment as a result of an injury suffered on the job.

In order to be eligible under this paragraph "b" an individual must present competent evidence showing adequate health reasons to justify termination; before quitting have informed the employer of the work-related health problem and inform the employer that the individual intends to quit unless the problem is corrected or the individual is reasonably accommodated. Reasonable accommodation includes other comparable work which is not injurious to the claimant's health and for which the claimant must remain available.

The claimant has the burden of proof to establish that the injury, illness or aggravation is workrelated. *Shontz v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission*, 248 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Iowa 1976). In this case, claimant has not met his burden. No medical documentation was furnished by the claimant regarding any medical condition, personal or allegedly aggravated by the workplace. The claimant had personal health conditions related to varicose veins and high blood pressure. On the claimant's final day of employment, he stated he was unable to get out of bed comfortably; this is even before entering the employer's premises. The claimant did not present any evidence that this discomfort had been caused by some work related condition. Further, the claimant did not present any competent evidence showing adequate health reasons to justify his quitting and was never advised by a physician to quit his job.

While a claimant does not have to specifically indicate or announce an intention to quit if concerns are not addressed by the employer, for a reason for a quit to be "attributable to the employer," a claimant faced with working conditions that he considers intolerable, unlawful or unsafe must normally take the reasonable step of notifying the employer about the unacceptable condition in order to give the employer reasonable opportunity to address his concerns. *Hy-Vee Inc. v. Employment Appeal Board*, 710 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2005); *Swanson v. Employment Appeal Board*, 554 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1996); *Cobb v. Employment Appeal Board*, 506 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1993). If the employer subsequently fails to take effective action to address or resolve the problem it then has made the cause for quitting "attributable to the employer." In the case at hand, the claimant did not notify his supervisor or any other person in management that he intended to quit because of health/work conditions or request accommodations related to a medical condition. Accordingly, the employer was not given an opportunity to make any changes or help the claimant preserve employment.

Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant's leaving the employment may have been based upon good personal reasons, but it was not for a good-cause reason attributable to the employer according to Iowa law. Benefits are denied.

DECISION:

The December 28, 2017, (reference 01) decision is affirmed. The appeal is timely. The claimant is able to and available for work effective December 10, 2017. The claimant voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer. Benefits are withheld until such time as he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn