

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section  
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319  
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

ROSE M RICCHIO  
470 POLE LINE RD  
POSTVILLE IA 52162

APAC CUSTOMER SERVICES INC  
c/o TALX UC EXPRESS  
PO BOX 283  
ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-04718-DT  
OC: 03/07/04 R: 04  
Claimant: Appellant (1)

**This Decision Shall Become Final**, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319**.

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

---

(Administrative Law Judge)

---

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Rose M. Ricchio (claimant) appealed a representative's April 15, 2004 decision (reference 02) that concluded she was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from APAC Customer Services, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on May 19, 2004. The claimant participated in the hearing and presented testimony from one other witness, Amanda Ricchio. Dan Wozney appeared on the employer's behalf. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with three related appeals, 04A-UI-04719-DT (regarding the claimant) and 04A-UI-04720-DT and 04A-UI-04721-DT (regarding Amanda Ricchio). Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on August 13, 2001 at the employer's Waterloo, Iowa telemarketing call center. The claimant requested a transfer to the employer's La Crosse, Wisconsin call center, which was granted. She began work there effective October 20, 2003. She worked full time as a customer service representative. Her last day of work was March 9, 2004. The employer discharged her on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was excessive absenteeism.

As of March 9, the claimant had incurred eight attendance points, even after deducting a half point for extra time worked. The majority of the claimant's points were due to transportation problems, either tires on the vehicle or engine problems. The distance from the claimant's home to the La Crosse, Wisconsin call center was further and created more wear and tear on the claimant's vehicle than she had anticipated. The employer's attendance policy provides for one point to be assessed for an absence or a tardy of over one hour, and a half point for a tardy of an hour or less. Termination would occur at eight points. The claimant had been given a formal warning on November 13, a first final warning on December 11, and a second final warning on February 12, 2004. The February 12 warning indicated that if there were two more incidents in the next 60 days, she would be discharged. The claimant was absent on February 22 and March 8, 2004. At least the March 8 incident and probably the February 22 incident were due to vehicle problems; on March 8 the vehicle would not start.

#### REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Absences due to issues that are of purely personal responsibility, including reliable transportation, are not excusable. Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984); Harlan v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1984). The claimant's final absence was not excused. The claimant had previously been warned that future absences could result in termination. Higgins v. IDJS, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). The employer discharged the claimant for reasons amounting to work-connected misconduct.

#### DECISION:

The representative's April 15, 2004 decision (reference 02) is affirmed. The employer discharged the claimant for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of March 9, 2004. This disqualification continues until she has been paid ten times her weekly benefit amount for insured work, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account will not be charged.

ld/kjf