BEFORE THE
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD
Lucas State Office Building
Fourth floor
Des Moines, Iowa 50319

MILADA HALILOVIC Claimant and **MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS** Employer	:	**HEARING NUMBER:** 17BUI-07611 **EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD DECISION**

N O T I C E

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT** IS FILED WITHIN **30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-2-A, 96.3-7

D E C I S I O N

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE DENIED

The Employer appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. The Appeal Board finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Milada Halilovic (Claimant) worked for Mediacom (Employer) as a part-time telemarketing representative from October 11, 2011 until she was fired on June 28, 2017. The Claimant signed for receipt of the Employer's handbook. The handbook indicates employees should not change identification numbers on transactions. The Employer did not issue the Claimant any performance warnings during her employment.

In 2015 the Claimant started altering generic e-commerce codes, that are non-commissionable, so that the sales involved were identified as her sales. In this way she was credited with sales that she did not make, and upon which she had no right to collect a commission. She did this knowing it was not permitted, and with the intent of stealing wages from the Employer by getting paid for work she did not do.

In mid-June 2017, the Claimant's supervisor asked her why she modified a code. The Claimant claimed that she thought it was permitted because, she claimed, everyone did it. The supervisor told her not to do it anymore. The Employer investigated while the Claimant continued to work through June 27, 2017. On June 28, 2017, the Employer terminated the Claimant for committing fraud. Its investigation revealed that only one other person had made similar alterations in the past and that this person was then also terminated for it.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) (2017) provides:

> *Discharge for Misconduct*. If the department finds the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
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> The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and been paid wages for the insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

The Division of Job Service defines misconduct at 871 IAC 24.32(1)(a):

> *Misconduct* is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in the carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

"This is the meaning which has been given the term in other jurisdictions under similar statutes, and we believe it accurately reflects the intent of the legislature." *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d, 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden to prove the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The propriety of a discharge is not at issue in an unemployment insurance case. An employer may be justified in discharging an employee, but the employee's conduct may not amount to misconduct precluding the payment of unemployment compensation. The law limits disqualifying misconduct to substantial and willful wrongdoing or repeated carelessness or negligence that equals willful misconduct in culpability. *Lee v. Employment Appeal Board*, 616 NW2d 661 (Iowa 2000).

It is the duty of the Board as the ultimate trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The Board, as the finder of fact, may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, as well as the weight to give other evidence, a Board member should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In determining the facts, and deciding what evidence to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence the Board believes; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). The Board also gives weight to the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge concerning credibility and weight of evidence, particularly where the hearing is in-person, although the Board is not bound by that opinion. Iowa Code §17A.10(3); *Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission*, 322 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 1982). The findings of fact show how we have resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. We have carefully weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the evidence considering the applicable factors listed above, and the Board's collective common sense and experience. We have found the Claimant's testimony that she was merely doing what others had done, and thought it was an allowed practice, to be not credible. The Employer's investigation shows that in fact others were *not* doing this except for one person – and that person was also terminated. Also, just at a common sense level, it makes no sense that the Employer would allow workers to take credit for generic e-commerce sales they had nothing to do with bringing about and did not up-sell. We find the claim of confusion incredible. We find that the Claimant gave herself credit for sales she did not make, that she knew this would result in her being paid wages for work she did not do, that she did this intentionally, and that she knew this was not permitted.

Theft from an employer is generally disqualifying misconduct. *Ringland Johnson Inc. v. Employment Appeal Board*, 585 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1998). In *Ringland* the Court found a single attempted theft to be misconduct as a matter of law. Here given our weighing of the evidence, we have little trouble finding the intentional theft to be misconduct. It was theft and not a good faith misunderstanding, and it was theft of considerable value. It was therefore clearly misconduct.

We find that the termination was timely in terms of the current act rule. "[T]he purpose of [the current act] rule is to assure that an employer does not save up acts of misconduct and spring them on an employee when an independent desire to terminate arises. For example, an employer may not convert a lay off into a termination for misconduct by relying on past acts." *Milligan v. EAB*, 10-2098, slip op. at 8 (Iowa App. June 15, 2011) The Employer here delayed from date it first learned of the infractions, only so that it could investigate the Claimant's claims that she thought it was OK and that others were doing it, and to investigate how many times the Claimant had made this alteration. We have no doubt that the termination was for the acts of fraud, and was not an instance of the Employer saving up past acts for use at a later time. In these circumstances the delay was not so long as to render the termination not for a current act.

Finally, since the Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and in so doing affirmed a decision of the claims representative the Claimant falls under the double affirmance rule:

> 871 IAC 23.43(3) Rule of two affirmances.
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> a. Whenever an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative or the employment appeal board of the Iowa department of inspections and appeals affirms

the decision of an administrative law judge, allowing payment of benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any further appeal.

b. However, if the decision is subsequently reversed by higher authority:

(1) The protesting employer involved shall have all charges removed for all payments made on such claim.
(2) All payments to the claimant will cease as of the date of the reversed decision unless the claimant is otherwise eligible.
(3) No overpayment shall accrue to the claimant because of payment made prior to the reversal of the decision.

Thus the Employer's account may not be charged for any benefits paid so far to the Claimant for the weeks in question, but the Claimant will not be required to repay benefits already received.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated August 14, 2017 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant was discharged for disqualifying misconduct. Accordingly, she is denied benefits until such time the Claimant has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the Claimant's weekly benefit amount, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(2)"a".

No remand for determination of overpayment need be made under the double affirmance rule, 871 IAC 23.43(3), but still the Employer's account may not be charged.

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Kim D. Schmett

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Ashley R. Koopmans

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James M. Strohman

RRA/fnv