IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

ARIELLE M BLOUNT

Claimant

APPEAL 17A-UI-03495-JCT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ATHENE EMPLOYEE SERVICES LLC

Employer

OC: 02/12/17

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quitting

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the March 10, 2017, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon separation. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on April 21, 2017. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Tina Finn, senior human resources representative. Department Exhibit D-1 was admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records including the fact-finding documents. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely? Did the claimant voluntarily quit the employment with good cause attributable to the employer?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: A disqualification decision was mailed to the claimant's last-known address of record on March 10, 2017. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Bureau by March 20, 2017. The claimant stated the mailing address used for the initial decision was incorrect and that she had notified IWD in February of the change of address. In light of the address error however, the claimant did receive the initial decision within the period to file an appeal. She did not file an appeal because she also received a reference 03 decision that found her eligible for benefits. The claimant did not question the reference 02 decision (at issue here), which denied her benefits and reference 03 decision which allowed her benefits, until she did not receive benefits as she expected. On March 29, 2017, the claimant contacted IWD for guidance and learned the disqualifying decision was not cancelled out by a subsequent favorable decision involving another employer. She then filed her appeal via email on March 29, 2017 (Department Exhibit D-1).

The claimant worked full-time for this employer as shared services representative from December 2014 until she quit on February 3, 2016, citing to childcare issues. The claimant has two small children and a husband who travels during the week for business. She does not have family in the local area to help with childcare. The claimant was made aware she would have to work some mandatory overtime at the employer's discretion when hired, but stated due to ongoing overtime requirements, she faced difficulty securing childcare or faced disciplinary action. The evidence presented does not support the claimant requested a waiver or any accommodations to preserve employment prior to quitting. Continuing work was available.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant's appeal is untimely.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disgualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Bd. of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative

if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). Even though the initial decision was mailed to the claimant's prior mailing address, she acknowledged she received the decision within the prescribed appeal period. The delay in filing her appeal was not due to an agency mailing error but rather the claimant's confusion because she received the initial decision (reference 02) that denied her benefits, which is at issue here and a subsequent decision (reference 03) that allowed benefits. The claimant did not contact IWD immediately to question the decisions which appeared to conflict, but waited until she did not receive anticipated monies to call on March 29, 2017, the same day she filed her appeal. The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

Even if the claimant's appeal was deemed timely filed, the claimant would be disqualified for benefits because she quit for reasons that would not constitute good cause attributable to the employer in under lowa Code § 96.5(1).

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(17) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(17) The claimant left because of lack of child care.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(18) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(18) The claimant left because of a dislike of the shift worked.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(21) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to lowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving lowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(21) The claimant left because of dissatisfaction with the work environment.

An employer has the right to allocate personnel in accordance with the needs and available resources. *Brandi v IDJS*, (Unpublished Iowa App. 1986). The claimant was made aware she would have to work some mandatory overtime at the time of hire, based upon business needs. Due to the claimant's childcare situation, working mandatory overtime became burdensome as she did not have available childcare or family to help when she had to work. Based on the evidence presented, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant's leaving the employment may have been based upon good personal reasons, it was not for a good cause reason attributable to the employer according to Iowa law. Benefits must be denied.

DECISION:

The March 10, 2017, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

Jennifer L. Beckman Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
jlb/rvs	