IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

JUDY STOLL
Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-21576-SN-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

WALMART INC

Employer

OC: 04/19/21

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.4(3) – Ability to and Availability for Work Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.22 – Able & Available - Benefits Eligibility Conditions Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant, Judy Stoll, filed an appeal from the April 19, 2021, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon the reasoning she was not able to and available for work effective February 21, 2021. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was scheduled to be held on November 23, 2021. The claimant participated. Official notice was taken of the agency records. Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into the record.

ISSUES:

Whether the claimant's appeal is timely? Whether the claimant's appeal has reasonable grounds to be considered otherwise timely?

Was the claimant able to work, available for work, and actively and earnestly seeking work the week ending effective February 21, 2021?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

A disqualification decision was mailed to claimant's last known address of record on April 19, 2021. The claimant did receive the decision within ten days. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by April 29, 2021. (Exhibit D-1) The appeal was not filed until September 28, 2021, which is after the date noticed on the disqualification decision. (Exhibit D-2)

The claimant testified she received the decision on time. The claimant explained that she did not initially appeal because she believed it to be futile.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The claimant's appeal is untimely. The administrative law judge further concludes he does not have jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the claimant's appeal.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of issuing the notice of the filing of the claim to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. All interested parties shall select a format as specified by the department to receive such notifications. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disgualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was issued, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. There is nothing on the record suggesting the delay in the claimant's appeal had anything to do with Iowa Workforce Development or the US Postal Service. The claimant made a decision regarding whether to appeal or not after receiving the decision. As a result, the appeal period is not tolled.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The April 19, 2021, (reference 01), decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.



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