IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

TANIA A KLIVEN

Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-01021-S1-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

ABCM CORPORATION

Employer

OC: 09/20/20

Claimant: Appellant (1)

lowa Code § 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal

lowa Code § 96.5-2-a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Code § 96.5-1 - Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Tania Kliven (claimant) appealed a representative's November 23, 2020, decision (reference 01) that concluded ineligibility to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from work with ABCM Corporation (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on February 12, 2021. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated by Sheri Weaver-Isvik, Administrator; Carman Ostrem, Human Resources Coordinator; and Jenna Kuechenberg, Director of Nursing.

Exhibit D-1 was received into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative file.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether the appeal was filed in a timely manner.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: A disqualification decision was mailed to the parties' last known address of record on November 23, 2020. The claimant received the decision within ten days. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by December 3, 2020. The appeal was filed on December 5, 2020, which is after the date noticed on the decision. The claimant did not file the appeal by December 5, 2020, because she was looking and couldn't find information from handbooks about the "seven minute leeway rule".

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

lowa Code section 96.6(2) provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsections 10 and 11, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (lowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (lowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. The claimant did not file her appeal within the time period allotted because she was searching for information.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to lowa Code § 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a

determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373 (lowa 1979) and *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877 (lowa 1979).

DECISION:

The November 23, 2020, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

Note to Claimant: This decision determines you are not eligible for regular unemployment insurance benefits. If you disagree with this decision you may file an appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by following the instructions on the first page of this decision. Individuals who do not qualify for regular unemployment insurance benefits due to disqualifying separations, but who are currently unemployed for reasons related to COVID-19 may qualify for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). You will need to apply for PUA to determine your eligibility under the program. Additional information on how to apply for PUA can be found at https://www.iowaworkforcedevelopment.gov/pua-information.

Beth A. Scheetz

Administrative Law Judge

But A. Jeherty

February 24, 2021

Decision Dated and Mailed

bas/scn