BEFORE THE
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD
Lucas State Office Building
Fourth floor
Des Moines, Iowa 50319

CENTRAIL K HANKINS	:	
Claimant	:	**HEARING NUMBER:** 15B-UI-07132
and	:	**EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD DECISION**
QPS EMPLOYMENT GROUP INC	:	
Employer		

N O T I C E

THIS DECISION BECOMES FINAL unless (1) a **request for a REHEARING** is filed with the Employment Appeal Board within **20 days** of the date of the Board's decision or, (2) a **PETITION TO DISTRICT COURT** IS FILED WITHIN **30 days** of the date of the Board's decision.

A REHEARING REQUEST shall state the specific grounds and relief sought. If the rehearing request is denied, a petition may be filed in **DISTRICT COURT** within **30 days** of the date of the denial.

SECTION: 96.5-1-J

D E C I S I O N

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ARE DENIED

The Employer appealed this case to the Employment Appeal Board. The members of the Employment Appeal Board reviewed the entire record. The Appeal Board finds it cannot affirm the administrative law judge's decision. The Employment Appeal Board **REVERSES** as set forth below.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact are adopted by the Board as its own with the exception of modifying the fourth sentence to read: "The claimant was given a copy of the document which was separate from the contract of hire." We also correct the date "September 17, 2014" to "September 17, 2013."

We also correct the statement of the case to reflect that the Claimant did not participate in the hearing.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code Section 96.5(1) states:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

Iowa Code section 96.5(1)"j" provides:

> An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
>
> 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
>
> j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.
>
> To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.
>
> For the purposes of this paragraph:
>
> (1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.
>
> (2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

Exhibit one satisfies all the conditions of the statute. It is a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences for not complying, in both English and Spanish. It is signed, and on a separate sheet given to the claimant. We note the statute requires that the policy be "separate from" the contract of hire, not that the policy not be a "part of" the contract of hire. Legally, of course an agreement to comply with the Employer's policies is "part of" the contract of hire – that is, such compliance is agreed to by the parties as a condition of employ. Thus when the Administrative Law Judge asked if the policy

was "part of the contract of hire" the Employer naturally responded "yes." But the statute is referencing that the written document itself must be physically "separate" from any written contract. That is manifestly satisfied here. As long as any documents are physically severable then the Code is satisfied.

Finally, since the Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and in so doing affirmed a decision of the claims representative the Claimant falls under the double affirmance rule:

> 871 IAC 23.43(3) Rule of two affirmances.
>
> a. Whenever an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative or the employment appeal board of the Iowa department of inspections and appeals affirms the decision of an administrative law judge, allowing payment of benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any further appeal.
>
> b. However, if the decision is subsequently reversed by higher authority:
>
> (1) The protesting employer involved shall have all charges removed for all payments made on such claim.
> (2) All payments to the claimant will cease as of the date of the reversed decision unless the claimant is otherwise eligible.
> (3) No overpayment shall accrue to the claimant because of payment made prior to the reversal of the decision.

Thus the Employer's account may not be charged for any benefits paid so far to the Claimant for the weeks in question, but the Claimant will not be required to repay benefits already received.

Note to Claimant: The procedural aspects of this case are a little odd. The Claimant did not attend the hearing. We do not know if the Claimant had a legally sufficient excuse for not attending since he has filed no argument with the Board. We recognize, of course, that until today the Claimant had prevailed and thus has no reason to try to explain his absence at hearing. We point this out now so that the Claimant is explicitly aware of the ability to apply for rehearing of today's decision within 20 days of issuance of today's decision. The Claimant may make whatever argument for reopening that he thinks appropriate, and this would include argument explaining why the Claimant failed to attend the hearing. We are not saying the argument would necessarily prevail, only that we would consider it. We do caution that the 20-day deadline for applying for rehearing is not flexible.

DECISION:

The administrative law judge's decision dated July 24, 2015 is **REVERSED**. The Employment Appeal Board concludes that the Claimant quit but not for good cause attributable to the employer. Accordingly, he is denied benefits until such time as the Claimant has worked in and was paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the Claimant's weekly benefit amount, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible. See, Iowa Code section 96.5(1)"g".

No remand for determination of overpayment need be made under the double affirmance rule, 871 IAC 23.43(3), but still the Employer's account may not be charged.

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Kim D. Schmett

_____
Ashley R. Koopmans

_____
James M. Strohman

RRA/fnv
DATED AND MAILED:_____

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