IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

PHILLIP K HARRIS

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 10A-UI-08674-LT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

TEMPS NOW HEARTLAND LLC

Employer

OC: 03/07/10

Claimant: Respondent (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.5(1)j – Voluntary Leaving (Temporary Assignment)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed a timely appeal from the June 14, 2010 (reference 02) decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on August 10, 2010. Claimant participated. Employer participated through Shay Munson-Fox and was represented by Laura Gawronski of Personnel Planners.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged from the temporary assignment for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits and if he quit the employment without good cause attributable to the employer.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant most recently worked full-time as a temporary fork lift driver at Medicote in Waterloo, Iowa and was separated from employment on May 7, 2010 by the Temps Now onsite supervisor Mary. On April 29, 2010 supervisor Regina alleged that he failed to bring hot parts to the line. He went to retrieve them with the forklift but they were not ready at the tunnel until just before Regina arrived in the area. Regina yelled at him and he asked her not to do so since he was responsible for supplying three lines with parts. She was also inconsistent in her instructions. He had not been warned his job was in jeopardy for any reason. He did not refuse to perform any assigned job duties. After the separation he called Mary frequently (daily, then weekly) at the only number provided to him to see if there was more work for him. There was not.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from the assignment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

When the record is composed solely of hearsay evidence, that evidence must be examined closely in light of the entire record. *Schmitz v. IDHS*, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Iowa App. 1990). Both the quality and the quantity of the evidence must be evaluated to see whether it rises to the necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs. See, Iowa Code § 17A.14 (1). In making the evaluation, the fact-finder should conduct a common sense evaluation of (1) the nature of the hearsay; (2) the availability of better evidence; (3) the cost of acquiring better information; (4) the need for precision; and (5) the administrative policy to be fulfilled. *Schmitz*, 461 N.W.2d at 608.

Claimant has adequately rebutted employer's hearsay allegations of insubordination. Since employer has not established misconduct with respect to the separation from the assignment, benefits are allowed on that basis. The next question is whether claimant's separation from the temporary agency employer is disqualifying.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-j provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department, but the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:
- j. The individual is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment within three working days of the completion of each employment assignment under a contract of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary employment firm upon completion of an employment assignment or the individual had good cause for not contacting the temporary employment firm within three working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.

To show that the employee was advised in writing of the notification requirement of this paragraph, the temporary employment firm shall advise the temporary employee by requiring the temporary employee, at the time of employment with the temporary employment firm, to read and sign a document that provides a clear and concise explanation of the notification requirement and the consequences of a failure to notify. The document shall be separate from any contract of employment and a copy of the signed document shall be provided to the temporary employee.

For the purposes of this paragraph:

- (1) "Temporary employee" means an individual who is employed by a temporary employment firm to provide services to clients to supplement their work force during absences, seasonal workloads, temporary skill or labor market shortages, and for special assignments and projects.
- (2) "Temporary employment firm" means a person engaged in the business of employing temporary employees.

871 IAC 24.26(19) provides:

Voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the employer and separations not considered to be voluntary quits. The following are reasons for a claimant leaving employment with good cause attributable to the employer:

(19) The claimant was employed on a temporary basis for assignment to spot jobs or casual labor work and fulfilled the contract of hire when each of the jobs was completed. An election not to report for a new assignment to work shall not be construed as a voluntary leaving of employment. The issue of a refusal of an offer of suitable work shall be adjudicated when an offer of work is made by the former employer. The provisions of lowa Code § 96.5(3) and rule 24.24(96) are controlling in the determination of suitability of work. However, this subrule shall not apply to substitute school employees who are subject to the provisions of lowa Code § 96.4(5) which denies benefits that are based on service in an educational institution when the individual declines or refuses to accept a

new contract or reasonable assurance of continued employment status. Under this circumstance, the substitute school employee shall be considered to have voluntarily quit employment.

The purpose of the statute is to provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the claimant is available for work at the conclusion of the temporary assignment. In this case, the employer had notice of the claimant's availability because they notified him of the end of the assignment. Since there were no additional assignments, benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The June 14, 2010 (reference 02) decision is affirmed. The claimant's separation from the assignment was not disqualifying and because he had adequate contact with the employer about his availability as required by statute, the separation from the employment was attributable to the employer. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/pjs