

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

CRYSTAL A RETTINGHAUS
Claimant

WELLS ENTERPRISES INC
Employer

APPEAL 18A-UI-05626-NM-T
**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 04/22/18
Claimant: Respondent (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.3(7) – Recovery of Benefit Overpayment
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 – Employer/Representative Participation Fact-finding Interview

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The employer filed an appeal from the May 7, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that allowed benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on June 7, 2018. The claimant did not participate. The employer participated through Hearing Representative Barb Hamilton and witness Ryan Hutchinson. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 6 were received into evidence. Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

Has the claimant been overpaid any unemployment insurance benefits, and if so, can the repayment of those benefits to the agency be waived?

Can any charges to the employer's account be waived?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full time as an assistant machine operator from September 19, 2016, until this employment ended on April 13, 2018, when she was discharged.

The employer has a points-based attendance policy in place. (Exhibit 1). Employees are allowed to accumulate up to ten points in a rolling calendar year before they are discharged. Claimant was aware of this policy. On March 22, 2018, claimant received a final written warning for her attendance, noting she had ten occurrences as of March 4, 2018. (Exhibit 3). The employer was not certain of the reason claimant was absent from work on any of the ten occasions. Claimant had previously indicated she was working on getting FMLA leave approved for one of her absences, on March 1, 2018. Claimant was told by the employer that if

she got approval for that absence it would not be counted towards her occurrences. Because the employer was waiting to see if the March 1 absence received FMLA approval it did not discharge claimant from employment at the time of the March 22 warning.

The employer received notice from the FMLA approver that claimant's request for FMLA had been denied. Claimant was given three weeks, until April 13, 2018, to appeal the decision or obtain additional information to substantiate her FMLA claim with the approver. On April 9, 2018, the employer spoke with its FMLA approver and was told it had not heard from claimant at all in the last three weeks. The employer was also advised that the request was denied because claimant did not fill out the necessary paperwork. That same day, Hutchinson called claimant to ask why she had not submitted her paperwork. He explained to claimant that if she had not turned in her documentation by April 13, 2018, she would be discharged from employment. Claimant told Hutchinson he could not fire her and hung up on him. Claimant's documentation was not submitted by April 13, 2018, and she was separated from employment. (Exhibit 2).

The claimant filed a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits with an effective date of April 22, 2018. The claimant filed for and received a total of \$1,960.00 in unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks between April 22 and May 19, 2018. The employer did not participate in a fact finding interview regarding the separation on May 4, 2018. The administrative record shows the employer did provide the name and telephone number for the representative participating in the hearing, however, there is nothing on the fact-finding documents indicating that individual was called, as the only number written on those documents is to the employer's main line. The fact finder determined claimant qualified for benefits.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or

disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192. Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." *Cosper* at 10.

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

An employer's point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits; however, an employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to

work. Here, the claimant had ten absences within the 12-month period prior to her separation. The only absence which the evidence shows may have been excused was the one on March 1, 2018, for which claimant was seeking FMLA approval. However, claimant failed to take the necessary steps to provide the employer with the necessary paperwork to approve that absence. Hutchinson specifically warned claimant that if she did not submit her FMLA paperwork she would be discharged as of April 13, 2018. Claimant's response was to hang up on Hutchinson and no paperwork was ever provided. The employer has established that the claimant was warned that a failure to submit her FMLA paperwork would result in termination of employment. This request was reasonable and claimant chose not to submit the paperwork as directed. Claimant's failure to follow this directive, and thereby excuse her absence, is disqualifying misconduct. Benefits are withheld.

The next issue is whether claimant has been overpaid benefits. Iowa Code § 96.3(7)a-b, as amended in 2008, provides:

7. Recovery of overpayment of benefits.

a. If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered. The department in its discretion may recover the overpayment of benefits either by having a sum equal to the overpayment deducted from any future benefits payable to the individual or by having the individual pay to the department a sum equal to the overpayment.

b. (1) (a) If the department determines that an overpayment has been made, the charge for the overpayment against the employer's account shall be removed and the account shall be credited with an amount equal to the overpayment from the unemployment compensation trust fund and this credit shall include both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5. The employer shall not be relieved of charges if benefits are paid because the employer or an agent of the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department's request for information relating to the payment of benefits. This prohibition against relief of charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers.

(b) However, provided the benefits were not received as the result of fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual, benefits shall not be recovered from an individual if the employer did not participate in the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to section 96.6, subsection 2, and an overpayment occurred because of a subsequent reversal on appeal regarding the issue of the individual's separation from employment.

(2) An accounting firm, agent, unemployment insurance accounting firm, or other entity that represents an employer in unemployment claim matters and demonstrates a continuous pattern of failing to participate in the initial determinations to award benefits, as determined and defined by rule by the department, shall be denied permission by the department to represent any employers in unemployment insurance matters. This subparagraph does not apply to attorneys or counselors admitted to practice in the courts of this state pursuant to section 602.10101.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.10 provides:

Employer and employer representative participation in fact-finding interviews.

(1) "Participate," as the term is used for employers in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means submitting detailed factual information of the quantity and quality that if un rebutted would be sufficient to result in a decision favorable to the employer. The most effective means to participate is to provide live testimony at the interview from a witness with firsthand knowledge of the events leading to the separation. If no live testimony is provided, the employer must provide the name and telephone number of an employee with firsthand information who may be contacted, if necessary, for rebuttal. A party may also participate by providing detailed written statements or documents that provide detailed factual information of the events leading to separation. At a minimum, the information provided by the employer or the employer's representative must identify the dates and particular circumstances of the incident or incidents, including, in the case of discharge, the act or omissions of the claimant or, in the event of a voluntary separation, the stated reason for the quit. The specific rule or policy must be submitted if the claimant was discharged for violating such rule or policy. In the case of discharge for attendance violations, the information must include the circumstances of all incidents the employer or the employer's representative contends meet the definition of unexcused absences as set forth in 871—subrule 24.32(7). On the other hand, written or oral statements or general conclusions without supporting detailed factual information and information submitted after the fact-finding decision has been issued are not considered participation within the meaning of the statute.

(2) "A continuous pattern of nonparticipation in the initial determination to award benefits," pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, as the term is used for an entity representing employers, means on 25 or more occasions in a calendar quarter beginning with the first calendar quarter of 2009, the entity files appeals after failing to participate. Appeals filed but withdrawn before the day of the contested case hearing will not be considered in determining if a continuous pattern of nonparticipation exists. The division administrator shall notify the employer's representative in writing after each such appeal.

(3) If the division administrator finds that an entity representing employers as defined in Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, has engaged in a continuous pattern of nonparticipation, the division administrator shall suspend said representative for a period of up to six months on the first occasion, up to one year on the second occasion and up to ten years on the third or subsequent occasion. Suspension by the division administrator constitutes final agency action and may be appealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19.

(4) "Fraud or willful misrepresentation by the individual," as the term is used for claimants in the context of the initial determination to award benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6, subsection 2, means providing knowingly false statements or knowingly false denials of material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment insurance benefits. Statements or denials may be either oral or written by the claimant. Inadvertent misstatements or mistakes made in good faith are not considered fraud or willful misrepresentation.

This rule is intended to implement Iowa Code section 96.3(7)“b” as amended by 2008 Iowa Acts, Senate File 2160.

Because the claimant’s separation was disqualifying, benefits were paid to which she was not entitled. The unemployment insurance law provides that benefits must be recovered from a claimant who receives benefits and is later determined to be ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant acted in good faith and was not otherwise at fault. However, the overpayment will not be recovered when it is based on a reversal on appeal of an initial determination to award benefits on an issue regarding the claimant’s employment separation if: (1) the benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by the claimant and (2) the employer did not participate in the initial proceeding to award benefits. The benefits were not received due to any fraud or willful misrepresentation by claimant. Additionally, the employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview. Thus, claimant is not obligated to repay to the agency the benefits she received.

The law also states that an employer is to be charged if “the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the department’s request for information relating to the payment of benefits. . .” Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(b)(1)(a). Here, the employer responded to the notice of a fact-finding interview by faxing a document identifying the phone number at which the proper representatives could be reached for the fact-finding interview. For some reason, that individual was not called. Benefits were paid, but not because the employer failed to respond timely or adequately to the agency’s request for information relating to the payment of benefits. Instead, benefits were paid because employer’s designated representative did not receive a call from the agency. Employer thus cannot be charged. Since neither party is to be charged then the overpayment is absorbed by the fund.

DECISION:

The May 7, 2018, (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for disqualifying misconduct. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible. The claimant has been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$1,960.00 but is not obligated to repay the agency those benefits. The employer did not participate in the fact-finding interview due to no fault of its own and its account shall not be charged. Rather, the overpayment should be charged to the fund.

Nicole Merrill
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

nm/rvs