

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI**

**Appeal Number: 06A-UI-06344-DT
OC: 05/21/06 R: 03
Claimant: Appellant (2)**

**MELVIN L BENSON
1135 FLAMMANG DR APT 4
WATERLOO IA 50702-4325**

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.**

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

**TYSON FRESH MEATS INC
c/o TALX UCM SERVICES
PO BOX 283
ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283**

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.5-1 – Voluntary Leaving

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Melvin L. Benson (claimant) appealed a representative's June 16, 2006 decision (reference 01) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment from Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on July 11, 2006. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer's representative received the hearing notice and responded by calling the Appeals Section on July 10, 2006, indicating that two witnesses would be available at the scheduled time for the hearing at a specified telephone number. However, when the administrative law judge called that number at the scheduled time for the hearing, no witnesses were not available. Therefore, the employer did not participate in the hearing. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the claimant, and

the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was there a disqualifying separation from employment either through a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer or through a discharge for misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on October 25, 2005. He worked full time doing bagging on the butt line at the employer's Waterloo, Iowa, pork processing plant on the second shift, normally from 3:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., Monday through Friday. His last day of work was May 19, 2006.

The claimant had previously incurred 13.5 points under the employer's attendance policy. On Friday, May 19, the claimant worked his regular shift, clocking out at approximately 12:05 a.m. However, at approximately 11:00 p.m. the claimant's supervisor had advised the crew that they would be required to work about two hours of overtime. The claimant protested because the employer's agreement with the union was that mandatory overtime was to be either posted at the beginning of the shift or was at least to be stated by the lunch break, which was at approximately 9:15 p.m. Further, the claimant had inquired of another supervisor at approximately 10:30 p.m. if there was going to be overtime, and was told that there was none announced at that point. Therefore, the claimant refused to work the additional hours and left at his end of his regular shift.

When the claimant sought to return to work on Monday, May 22, he was brought in and told he was being suspended for walking off the job on May 19. When he returned on May 23 to learn the outcome, he was informed his employment was ended for both job abandonment for walking off his shift and for excessive points, as the additional points assessed due to his leaving on May 19 put him at the employer's termination level.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit.

Iowa Code section 96.5-1 provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department.

871 IAC 24.25 provides that, in general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. A voluntary leaving of employment requires an intention to terminate the employment relationship accompanied by an overt act of carrying out that intention. Bartelt v. Employment Appeal Board, 494 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1993). The employer asserted that the claimant was not discharged but that he quit by job abandonment. The administrative law judge concludes that the employer has failed to satisfy its burden that the claimant voluntarily quit. Iowa Code section 96.6-2. As the separation was not a voluntary quit, it must be treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment insurance. 871 IAC 24.26(21).

The issue in this case is then whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right or even had any other choice but to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 1. The employer's interest, or
 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an

intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

871 IAC 24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

The reason the employer effectively discharged the claimant was for refusing to work overtime on May 19, 2006. While refusal to work overtime can be misconduct in some circumstances, here the employer provided only an hour notice, which was contrary to the agreement with the union. Endicott v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 367 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa App. 1985); Boyd v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 377 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa App. 1985); Pierce v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's June 16, 2006 decision (reference 01) is reversed. The claimant did not voluntarily quit and the employer did discharge the claimant, but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible.

ld/kkf