

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

HILLIS S RUTTER
Claimant

APPEAL 19A-UI-05014-JC-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

MENARD INC
Employer

OC: 05/12/19
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant, Hillis S. Rutter, appealed the May 31, 2019 (reference 01) initial decision that denied benefits based upon her separation with this employer. After proper notice, a telephone hearing was scheduled for July 18, 2019, but postponed to allow the claimant to obtain her exhibits. On July 29, 2019, a telephone hearing was conducted. The claimant participated personally. The employer participated through Steve Etko Jr., front end manager. Heath Streeter, general manager, also testified. Department Exhibit D-1 (Claimant appeal letter) and Employer Exhibits 1-5 were admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge took official notice of the administrative records. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Is the appeal timely?

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant began working for employer on October 15, 2014. Claimant last worked as a part-time cashier. Claimant was separated from employment on May 9, 2019, when she was discharged.

The employer has a three step process it requires for its cashiers to ensure a positive experience. The cashier is expected to greet the guest, offer extended warranty protection if applicable, and thank the guest for shopping at Menards when they leave. Prior to separation, the claimant received two documented warnings related to guest service type issues (Employer Exhibit 2, 3). The employer stated the final incident occurred when it reported multiple complaints from guests over the weekend of May 4-5 about the claimant being abrupt and having a bad attitude. The employer stated first it was 2-3 people and then 2 people who approached management. Neither employer witness had specific information about the guest complaints, nor was any documentation provided in support of the complaints. In contrast, the

claimant stated she did not work on May 4, 2019 and denied the allegations. She was subsequently discharged.

An initial unemployment insurance decision (Reference 01) resulting in a disqualification of benefits was mailed to the claimant's last known address of record on May 31, 2019. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Bureau by June 10, 2019. The claimant did not receive the decision in the mail and checks the mail regularly. It has been her address of record for approximately 20 years. She learned of the initial decision on June 18, 2019 when she visited the Burlington IWD office, and inquired about the status of her claim. She filed her appeal three days later on June 21, 2019 by fax (Department Exhibit D-1).

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The first issue to address is whether the appeal is considered timely. It is.

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) provides, in pertinent part:

Filing – determination – appeal.

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2) provides:

Date of submission and extension of time for payments and notices.

(2) The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the division that the delay in submission was due to division error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service.

a. For submission that is not within the statutory or regulatory period to be considered timely, the interested party must submit a written explanation setting forth the circumstances of the delay.

b. The division shall designate personnel who are to decide whether an extension of time shall be granted.

c. No submission shall be considered timely if the delay in filing was unreasonable, as determined by the department after considering the circumstances in the case.

d. If submission is not considered timely, although the interested party contends that the delay was due to division error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States postal service, the division shall issue an appealable decision to the interested party.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. *Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); *Johnson v. Board of Adjustment*, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott*, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. *Hendren v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

The claimant did not have an opportunity to appeal the fact-finder's decision because the decision was not received. Without notice of a disqualification, no meaningful opportunity for appeal exists. See *Smith v. Iowa Emp't Sec. Comm'n*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The claimant visited her local IWD office on June 18, 2019, which was a reasonable time after establishing her claim, to check on its status. This visit was her first notice of disqualification. She filed her appeal three days later. Therefore, the appeal shall be accepted as timely.

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa law disqualifies individuals who are discharged from employment for misconduct from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a. They remain disqualified until such time as they requalify for benefits by working and earning insured wages ten times their weekly benefit amount. *Id.*

Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.32(1)a provides:

"Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not

necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.* Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and reliability of the evidence in conjunction with the applicable burden of proof, as shown in the factual conclusions reached in the above-noted findings of fact, the administrative law judge concludes that the employer has not satisfied its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) *Past acts of misconduct.* While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The purpose of this rule is to assure that an employer does not save up acts of misconduct and spring them on an employee when an independent desire to terminate arises. For example, an employer may not convert a lay off into a termination for misconduct by relying on past acts. *Milligan v. EAB*, 802 N.W.2d 238 (Table)(Iowa App. June 15, 2011).

Here, the employer discharged the claimant for poor guest service and stated it was due to multiple complaints over May 4-5, 2019. The employer could not provide specific details or even the number of complaints and had no documentation to support the complaints. In contrast, the claimant credibly testified she was not working one of the two days the alleged complaints came in, and denied being rude or having a poor attitude. Based on the evidence presented, the employer has failed to present sufficient details to meet its burden of proof in establishing a current act of disqualifying job-related misconduct. As such, benefits are allowed.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under Iowa law.

DECISION:

The May 31, 2019 (reference 01) initial decision is reversed. The appeal is timely. The claimant was not discharged for job-related misconduct. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Jennifer L. Beckman
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn