

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

JOANN L MCCOY
Claimant

CRESTVIEW ACRES INC
Employer

APPEAL 17A-UI-09545-DL-T

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

OC: 08/13/17
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed an appeal from the September 8, 2017, (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits based upon a discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on October 4, 2017. Claimant participated. Employer participated through administrator Peter Kleinsteuber and DON Paulette Jacobson participated near the end of the hearing.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time CNA through August 4, 2017. On August 4 claimant arrived to work late and went to DON Paulette Jacobson's office to tell her about personal issues related to her husband and their divorce proceedings. Jacobson had already covered claimant's shift with a temporary worker after she texted that she would be late. Jacobson told her she was emotional to the point she was not in any condition to work and sent her home. She was not sent home due to low patient census. On June 30, 2017, claimant had reported her absence fewer than two hours before her shift because of her son's illness. She had prior tardiness and was a no-call/no-show on July 2 and July 6, 2017. The employer's policy provides for consideration of medical excuses if presented but requires notice of absences at least two hours before the shift start time. Claimant was inconsistent about providing those and did not always timely report absences for various reasons. Kleinsteuber and Jacobson warned her in writing on July 28, 2017, about absenteeism and properly reporting absences. Neither party kept or submitted clear records of the attendance history, warnings or termination documents.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment due to job-related misconduct.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(4) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(4) The claimant was absent for three days without giving notice to employer in violation of company rule.

Since claimant did not have three consecutive no-call/no-show absences as required by the rule in order to consider the separation job abandonment, and her appearance at work on August 4 indicated her intention to continue working, the separation was a discharge and not a quit. Then the question becomes whether she was discharged for misconduct.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

Causes for disqualification.

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. *Discharge for misconduct.* If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); *Cosper*, supra; *Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. *Gaborit*, supra. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct **except for illness or other reasonable grounds** for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see *Higgins v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (Iowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. *Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. *Higgins* at 192.

Second, the absences must be unexcused. *Cosper* at 10. The requirement of “unexcused” can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for “reasonable grounds,” *Higgins* at 191, or because it was not “properly reported,” holding excused absences are those “with appropriate notice.” *Cosper* at 10.

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term “absenteeism” also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as “tardiness.” An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984). Absences due to illness or injury must be properly reported in order to be excused. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Both claimant and Kleinsteuber were inconsistent in their testimony and did not have details about dates and circumstances so are not considered credible witnesses. Noting that Jacobson’s testimony about her lack of authority to terminate employment was inconsistent with her actions, hers was the most credible testimony of the three witnesses regarding the events of August 4, 2017. An employer’s point system or no-fault absenteeism policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits; however, an employer is entitled to expect its employees to report to work as scheduled or to be notified as to when and why the employee is unable to report to work. The employer has established that the claimant was warned that further improperly reported or unexcused absences could result in termination of employment and the final absence (tardiness on August 4, 2017) was not properly reported and was unexcused. The final absence, in combination with the claimant’s history of unexcused absenteeism, is considered excessive. Benefits are withheld.

DECISION:

The September 8, 2017, (reference 03) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment due to excessive, unexcused absenteeism. Benefits are withheld until such time as she has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times her weekly benefit amount, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/rvs