IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section 1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319 DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

NELSON J ARMBRESTER 400 W MAIN ST GARDEN GROVE IA 50103-1010

PER MAR SECURITY & RESEARCH CORP PER MAR SECURITY SERVICES C/o TALX EMPLOYER SERVICES PO BOX 1160 COLUMBUS OH 43216-1160 Appeal Number: 06A-UI-02346-LT

OC: 01-29-06 R: 03 Claimant: Respondent (1)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the *Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.*

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

- The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
- 2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
- 3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
- 4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Ju	idge)
(Decision Dated & Ma	iled)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge/Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Employer filed a timely appeal from the February 16, 2006, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on March 9, 2006. Claimant did participate. Employer did participate through Matt Cunningham, Dean Harper and Melissa Ashby. Todd Burri of Per Mar was employer's representative. The administrative law judge took judicial notice of the administrative record.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed as a full-time third shift security supervisor from November 23, 2005 through January 23, 2006 when he was discharged. Dean Harper and Melissa Ashby reported that on January 21 claimant had allegedly reported to work intoxicated on Saturday night to train

Harper, that his truck almost hit the gate and the guard that opened the gate. They also accused him of driving in circles in the parking lot leaving tire skid marks, went inside the guard shack with a beer, spilled the beer, wiped it up with a newspaper, and left a short time later.

Ashby testified she saw him drive in and tear around in lot and when he spoke to her he smelled of alcohol. She was insistent she could not tell what kind of alcohol she smelled whether it was beer, wine, or distilled liquor but in her written statement to employer, she said he smelled of beer. Harper was working in a different guard shack than Ashby and noted that from where Ashby was she could not have seen claimant when Harper opened the gate for him.

Neither Ashby nor Harper mentioned that the other was present with claimant and they were not all three not together at the same time. Neither Ashby nor Harper called anyone to report the incident to claimant's supervisor until the next day.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. <u>Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service</u>, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. <u>Cosper v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. <u>Infante v. IDJS</u>, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. <u>Pierce v. IDJS</u>, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. <u>Newman v. lowa Department of Job Service</u>, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa App. 1984). Poor work performance is not misconduct in the absence of evidence of intent. Miller v. Employment Appeal Board, 423 N.W.2d 211 (lowa App. 1988).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. Inasmuch as employer's witnesses had discrepancies in their written statements and testimony, claimant's recollection of the events is credible, thus employer has not met the burden of proof to establish misconduct. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The February 16, 2006, reference 01, decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible.

dml/tjc