

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**DEVAN J WORTHINGTON**  
Claimant

**APPEAL NO. 15A-UI-07893-JTT**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**REM IOWA COMMUNITY SERVICES INC**  
Employer

**OC: 06/14/15**  
**Claimant: Respondent (1)**

Iowa Code Section 96.5(2)(a) – Discharge for Misconduct

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The employer filed a timely appeal from the June 30, 2015, reference 01, decision that allowed benefits to the claimant provided she was otherwise eligible and that held the employer's account could be charged for benefits, based on an Agency conclusion that the claimant had been discharged for no disqualifying reason. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on July 31, 2015. Claimant Devan Worthington participated. The employer did not respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. The administrative law judge took official notice of the Agency's record of benefits disbursed to the claimant.

**ISSUE:**

Whether the claimant separated from the employment for a reason that disqualifies her for benefits or that relieves the employer of liability for benefits.

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Devan Worthington was employed by REM Iowa Community Services, Inc., as a full-time Direct Support Professional from November 2013 and last performed work for the employer on or about February 13, 2015. At that point, the employer suspended Ms. Worthington in response to an allegation that Ms. Worthington had abused a dependent adult. The employer notified Ms. Worthington that she would be suspended indefinitely until the Department of Human Services completed its investigation of the matter. After Ms. Worthington had been suspended for more than a month, she contacted the employer to inquire about the status of her employment. The employer told her there was no new information and that she would continue on the indefinite suspension. Ms. Worthington and the employer engaged in further conversation regarding the length of the suspension. The parties discussed that it would be better for Ms. Worthington to quit than to be discharged from the employment. Ms. Worthington provided a written two-week notice of her intention to quit. At no time after Ms. Worthington was suspended did the employer recall Ms. Worthington to the employment.

## REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A discharge is a termination of employment initiated by the employer for such reasons as incompetence, violation of rules, dishonesty, laziness, absenteeism, insubordination, or failure to pass a probationary period. 871 IAC 24.1(113)(c). A quit is a separation initiated by the employee. 871 IAC 24.1(113)(b). In general, a voluntary quit requires evidence of an intention to sever the employment relationship and an overt act carrying out that intention. See Local Lodge #1426 v. Wilson Trailer, 289 N.W.2d 698, 612 (Iowa 1980) and Peck v. EAB, 492 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa App. 1992). In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer. See 871 IAC 24.25.

Iowa Administrative Code section 871 IAC 24.32(9) provides as follows:

Suspension or disciplinary layoff. Whenever a claim is filed and the reason for the claimant's unemployment is the result of a disciplinary layoff or suspension imposed by the employer, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct must be resolved. Alleged misconduct or dishonesty without corroboration is not sufficient to result in disqualification.

When it is in a party's power to produce more direct and satisfactory evidence than is actually produced, it may fairly be inferred that the more direct evidence will expose deficiencies in that party's case. See Crosser v. Iowa Dept. of Public Safety, 240 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1976).

The employer did not participate in the hearing and did not present any evidence to establish a voluntary separation from the employment or a discharge for misconduct. The evidence in the record establishes that Ms. Worthington was suspended and effectively discharged on or about February 13, 2015. Ms. Worthington did not voluntarily quit. Any attempt to recharacterize the separation as a voluntary quit more than a month after the suspension started would not change the underlying nature of the separation that had occurred weeks earlier.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an

intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The employer has the burden of proof in a discharge matter. See Iowa Code section 96.6(2). Misconduct must be substantial in order to justify a denial of unemployment benefits. Misconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits. See Lee v. Employment Appeal Board, 616 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2000). The focus is on deliberate, intentional, or culpable acts by the employee. See Gimbel v. Employment Appeal Board, 489 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of the current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act(s). The termination of employment must be based on a current act. See 871 IAC 24.32(8). In determining whether the conduct that prompted the discharge constituted a "current act," the administrative law judge considers the date on which the conduct came to the attention of the employer and the date on which the employer notified the claimant that the conduct subjected the claimant to possible discharge. See also Greene v. EAB, 426 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa App. 1988).

Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. See 871 IAC 24.32(4).

The evidence in the record establishes that Ms. Worthington was suspended and effectively discharged on or about February 13, 2015 based on an allegation of misconduct. The employer has presented no evidence to prove misconduct. Based on the evidence in the record and application of the appropriate law, the administrative law judge concludes that the claimant was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Accordingly, the claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged for benefits.

**DECISION:**

The June 30, 2015, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The claimant was discharged on or about February 13, 2015 for no disqualifying reason. The claimant is eligible for benefits, provided she is otherwise eligible. The employer's account may be charged.

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James E. Timberland  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/pjs