IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

KRISTI ZERANSKY

Claimant

APPEAL 21A-UI-14545-DZ-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

CASEYS MARKETING COMPANY

Employer

OC: 04/04/21

Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Kristi Zeransky, the claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the June 15, 2021 (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on August 20, 2021. Ms. Zeransky participated and testified. Theodore Johnson participated as Ms. Zeransky's hearing representative. The employer participated through Krisha Harris. Claimant's Exhibit A was admitted into evidence.

ISSUE:

Did Ms. Zeransky voluntary quit without good cause attributable to the employer, or was she discharged for disqualifying, job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Ms. Zeransky began working for the employer on October 6, 2020. She worked as a full-time store manager. Ms. Harris became store manager on, or about, March 1, 2021, at which point, Ms. Zeransky became food service leader. Ms. Zeransky was separated from employment on April 7, 2021.

The employer's policy provides that an employee must call-in at least two hours before the start of their shift, and if an employee is more than five minutes late, the employee is considered a No-Call/No-Show for that shift. Ms. Zeransky was written up as a No-Call/No-Show sometime during the week of March 1-5, and again in late March, for being more than five minutes late to her shifts.

Ms. Zeransky had a medical appointment scheduled for Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 8:00 a.m. Ms. Zeransky was also scheduled to work at 9:00 a.m. that day. On Saturday, April 3, Ms. Zeransky told Ms. Harris about the scheduled medical appointment. On Monday, April 5, Ms. Zeransky reminded Ms. Harris about the April 7 medical appointment. Ms. Zeransky told Ms. Harris that the employee who would be making donuts would be at work until 10:00 a.m. that morning so things would be covered while she was at her medical appointment.

On April 7, Ms. Zeransky went to her medical appointment and arrived at work at about 9:20 a.m. Soon after she arrived, Ms. Harris told her that her employment was terminated because the employer considered her a No-Call/No-Show that day.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes Ms. Zeransky discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The purpose of this rule is to assure that an employer does not save up acts of misconduct and spring them on an employee when an independent desire to terminate arises.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Higgins v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187, 192 (lowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10.

Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 9; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. See Gaborit, 734 N.W.2d at 555-558. An employer's no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191. When claimant does not provide an excuse for an absence the absences is deemed unexcused. Id.; see also Spragg v. Becker-Underwood, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 333, 2003 WL 22339237 (Iowa App. 2003). The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness; and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence.

The decision in this case rests, at least in part, on the credibility of the witnesses. It is the duty of the administrative law judge as the trier of fact in this case, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (lowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (lowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.*. In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other believable evidence; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence,

memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id*.

The findings of fact show how the administrative law has resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. The administrative law judge assessed the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using his own common sense and experience.

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related misconduct as the reason for the separation, it incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A determination as to whether an employee's act is misconduct does not rest solely on the interpretation or application of the employer's policy or rule. A violation is not necessarily disqualifying misconduct even if the employer was fully within its rights to impose discipline up to or including discharge for the incident under its policy.

The most recent incident leading to Ms. Zeransky's discharge must be a current act of misconduct in order to disqualify her from receiving benefits. In this case, the most recent act for which Ms. Zeransky was discharged was for being late to work on April 7, 2021 because she had a doctor's appointment that day. Ms. Zeransky told the employer about the doctor's appointment twice. Ms. Zeransky's properly her tardiness and the reason for her not attending work that day was reasonable. This is not misconduct. The employer has failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job-related misconduct. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The June 15, 2021, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Ms. Zeransky was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible. Any benefits claimed and withheld on this basis shall be paid.

Daniel Zeno

Administrative Law Judge Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau Iowa Workforce Development 1000 East Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0209 Fax 515-478-3528

September 14, 2021

Decision Dated and Mailed

Semal 300