# IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

**CRAIG AMMERMAN** 

Claimant

**APPEAL NO: 12A-UI-08430-BT** 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

**DECISION** 

**DEN HARTOG INDUSTRIES INC** 

Employer

OC: 06/10/12

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a - Discharge for Misconduct 871 IAC 24.32(7) - Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Craig Ammerman (claimant) appealed an unemployment insurance decision dated July 5, 2012, reference 01, which held that he was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because he was discharged from Den Hartog Industries, Inc. (employer) for work-related misconduct. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on August 27, 2012. The claimant participated in the hearing. The employer participated through Christine Koerselman, Human Resources Generalist and Tony Schuber, Production Manager. Employer's Exhibits One through Three were admitted into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

### ISSUE:

The issue is whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of unemployment benefits.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT:

The administrative law judge, having heard the testimony and considered all of the evidence in the record, finds that: The employer is a plastics manufacturer. The claimant was employed as a full-time oven operator from January 1, 2011 through June 15, 2012. He was discharged from employment due to excessive absenteeism with a final incident on June 14, 2012 when he missed work due to car problems. The claimant was last warned on April 30, 2012 when he received a three-day suspension for absenteeism. He signed the warning on which he acknowledged that a single future violation of company policy would result in termination of his employment.

The final incident on June 14, 2012 was the second unexcused absence after the final written warning. The first unexcused absence after that date occurred on June 11, 2012 when he was tardy for work. The employer issued the claimant his first written warning for excessive absenteeism on February 27, 2012. He was tardy four times and had numerous absences due to illness but the last two occurrences were not due to illness and could have been avoided.

#### **REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

The issue is whether the employer discharged the claimant for work-connected misconduct. A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a.

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

- (1) Definition.
- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden to prove the discharged employee is disqualified for benefits for misconduct. *Sallis v. Employment Appeal Bd.*, 437 N.W.2d 895, 896 (Iowa 1989). The claimant was discharged on June 15, 2012 for excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. See 871 IAC 24.32(7).

The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness, and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility

such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. *Higgins v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 350 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1984).

The employer has established that the claimant was warned that further unexcused absences could result in termination of employment and the final absence was not excused. The final absence, in combination with the claimant's history of absenteeism, is considered excessive. Benefits are denied.

## **DECISION:**

The unemployment insurance decision dated July 5, 2012, reference 01, is affirmed. The claimant is not eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because he was discharged from work for misconduct. Benefits are withheld until he has worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount, provided he is otherwise eligible.

Susan D. Ackerman Administrative Law Judge	
Decision Dated and Mailed	
sda/pjs	