

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section  
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319  
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

DONNA G ROBINSON  
1242 RALPH ST  
GRAND PRAIRIE TX 75051

WAL-MART STORES INC  
c/o TALX UC EXPRESS  
PO BOX 283  
ST LOUIS MO 63166-0283

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-10740-DT  
OC: 08/29/04 R: 12  
Claimant: Respondent (1)

**This Decision Shall Become Final**, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.**

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

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(Administrative Law Judge)

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(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge  
Section 96.6-2 - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (employer) appealed a representative's September 17, 2004 decision (reference 01) that concluded Donna G. Robinson (claimant) was qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment. After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 27, 2004. This appeal was consolidated for hearing with one related appeal, 04A-UI-10741-DT. The claimant participated in the hearing. Ezell Clark appeared on the employer's behalf and presented testimony from one other witness, Gayle Woodward. During the hearing, Exhibit A-1 was entered into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments of

the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUE:

Was the employer's appeal timely? Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

On September 17, 2004, the representative's decision was mailed to the address for the employer of 4320 Franklin Ave., Waco, Texas, 76710. This is not a known address for the employer, and the employer did not receive the decision. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by September 27, 2004. The appeal was not filed until October 4, 2004, which is after the date noticed on the September 17, 2004 disqualification decision; the employer appealed in response to a virtually identical representative's decision issued on September 22, 2004, which was sent to a proper address for the employer; that decision is the subject of 04A-UI-10741-DT.

After a prior period of employment with the employer, the claimant most recently started working for the employer in August 2000. In May 2004, she transferred from the employer's Arlington, Texas store to its Grand Prairie, Texas store, where she worked full time as a service desk cashier. Her last day of work was August 13, 2004. The employer discharged her on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was having excessive cash shortages.

On February 7, 2004, she was given a coaching for leaving her register unattended. On June 10, 2004, the claimant was given a verbal warning for a \$15.41 shortage. On July 8, 2004, the claimant was given a coaching for having a shortage of \$301.48. On August 6, 2004, the claimant had a shortage of \$199.82; this final incident led to the discharge on August 13. The employer had no reason to suspect the claimant had intentionally caused the shortage, but considered it to be due to her error. After August 6, the employer did not advise her of the pending examination of her actions until her discharge.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The preliminary issue in this case is whether the employer timely appealed the representative's decision.

Iowa Code Section 96.6-2 provides in pertinent part:

The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. . . . Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.

The ten calendar days for appeal begins running on the mailing date. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected

immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

Pursuant to rules 871 IAC 26.2(96)(1) and 871 IAC 24.35(96)(1), appeals are considered filed when postmarked, if mailed. Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983).

The record in this case shows that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). The record shows that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was due to Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service pursuant to 871 IAC 24.35(2), or other factor outside of the employer's control so that it did not have a due process opportunity to timely appeal the decision. The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal should be treated as timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code Section 96.6-2. Therefore, the administrative law judge has jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979); Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979), and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Employment Appeal Board, 465 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa App. 1990).

The substantive issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code Section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

- a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

- a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
  - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
  - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
  - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
  - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
    1. The employer's interest, or
    2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Henry, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is her final cash shortage on August 6, 2004. There is no current act of misconduct as required to establish work-connected misconduct. 871 IAC 24.32(8); Greene v. Employment Appeal Board, 426 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa App. 1988). The incident in question occurred a week prior to the employer's discharge of the claimant. Further, under the circumstances of this case, the claimant's error resulting in the shortage was the result of inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence, and was a good faith error in judgment or discretion. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence

provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

DECISION:

The representative's September 17, 2004 decision (reference 01) is affirmed. The appeal is treated as timely. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if she is otherwise eligible.

ld/kjf