

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

AMBER L PRICE
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 09A-UI-18468-LT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

BURKE MARKETING CORPORATION
Employer

OC: 10/25/09
Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant filed a timely appeal from the December 3, 2009 (reference 01) decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a telephone conference hearing was held on January 21, 2010. Claimant participated and was represented by Jay Kamath, Attorney at Law. Employer participated through Human Resources Generalist Shelli Seibert. Employer's Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted to the record.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether claimant was discharged for reasons related to job misconduct sufficient to warrant a denial of benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having heard the testimony and having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant most recently worked full time as a warehouse attendant and was separated from employment on November 9, 2009. On October 20 employer accused her of a safety violation when she failed to lock out and check trailers twice that day because she had assumed another employee had done so, was not allowed into the area where the trailer was and there was not enough equipment to do so. On the way to issue a written warning and suspend her pending investigation on October 23 Seibert observed another safety violation, which did not contribute to the decision to discharge. Employer interviewed her on October 27 and November 5, 2009. Employer interviewed supervisor Theresa Lukacik, who reported the alleged violations. Claimant had not been warned for safety issues earlier in her employment history.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. IDJS*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. IDJS*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job insurance benefits. Such misconduct must be "substantial." When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Newman v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa App. 1984).

In an at-will employment environment an employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job-related misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. The conduct for which claimant was discharged was merely an isolated incident of poor judgment by assuming someone else had locked out and chocked the trailer and failed to follow up on the lack of equipment. Regardless of prior unrelated warnings, inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about safety issues leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in

violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning about safety issues. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed.

DECISION:

The December 3, 2009 (reference 01) decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided claimant is otherwise eligible. The benefits withheld effective the week ending October 31, 2009 shall be paid to claimant.

Dévon M. Lewis
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

dml/css