IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

ASHLEY B JONES Claimant

APPEAL 20A-UI-00006-DB-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

THE VGM GROUP INC Employer

> OC: 12/01/19 Claimant: Appellant (2)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The claimant/appellant filed an appeal from the December 24, 2019 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied unemployment insurance benefits to the claimant based upon her discharge from employment. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was held on January 23, 2020. The claimant, Ashley B. Jones, participated personally. The employer, The VGM Group Inc., participated through witnesses Malisa Fender and Casee Boose.

ISSUE:

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: Claimant was employed full-time as a patient coordinator support worker beginning on July 1, 2019. Claimant's direct supervisor was Malisa Fender. Her job duties consisted of contacting patients, insurance carriers and medical facilities to make arrangements for medical services and procedures. Claimant was assigned a daily agenda or grid to work each day. Her employment ended on December 2, 2019 when she was discharged.

Claimant was discharged for lack of production and having an excess amount of idle time on her computer. After noticing that the claimant was on her personal telephone and not working on November 29, 2019, Ms. Fender audited the claimant's computer records. When the claimant is making notes, emails, or telephone calls on the computer it logs her activity. Ms. Fender determined that the claimant had several days in November where her computer was idle for significant periods of time. The claimant completed each of her daily agendas and was current on all required training modules. Claimant contacted her supervisors and co-workers to help others with their daily agendas as well.

Claimant had received a written discipline on November 13, 2019 for absenteeism. Claimant left work early on November 15, 2019 because her mother was admitted to the hospital. Claimant notified the employer prior to her leaving her scheduled shift early that day. Claimant

was absent from November 18, 2019 through November 22, 2019 because the claimant's sister had passed away. Her absences from November 18, 2019 through November 22, 2019 were approved by the employer. Claimant was absent on November 26, 2019 due to a scheduled doctor's appointment in Iowa City, Iowa. Claimant had previously requested to be off of work on November 26, 2019 and her request had been approved. Claimant made up the hours she missed on November 26, 2019 when she worked on November 25, 2019 and November 27, 2019.

Claimant was never instructed that she needed to maintain a certain percentage of time working on the computer or she would be discharged. Claimant was never warned that idle time on the computer would put her job in jeopardy. There were several times that the claimant requested additional work and no further work was available.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

The administrative law judge finds that the Claimant did not quit. Claimant was discharged from employment.

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute. This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(4) provides:

(4) Report required. The claimant's statement and employer's statement must give detailed facts as to the specific reason for the claimant's discharge. Allegations of misconduct or dishonesty without additional evidence shall not be sufficient to result in disqualification. If the employer is unwilling to furnish available evidence to corroborate the allegation, misconduct cannot be established. In cases where a suspension or disciplinary layoff exists, the claimant is considered as discharged, and the issue of misconduct shall be resolved.

The employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job-related misconduct. *Cosper v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (lowa 1982). The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (lowa Ct. App. 1988). Misconduct serious enough to warrant discharge is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of job *Serv.*, 351 N.W.2d 806 (lowa Ct. App. 1984). When based on carelessness, the carelessness must actually indicate a "wrongful intent" to be disqualifying in nature. *Id.* Negligence does not constitute misconduct unless recurrent in nature; a single act is not disqualifying unless indicative of a deliberate disregard of the employer's interests. *Henry v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 391 N.W.2d 731 (lowa Ct. App. 1986).

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Id. at 10. Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 743 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. Id. at 558. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer. lowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) (emphasis added); see Higgins v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187, 190, n. 1 (lowa 1984) holding "rule [2]4.32(7)...accurately states the law." The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191 or because it was not "properly reported." Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191 (Iowa 1984) and Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (Iowa 1982). Excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10 (lowa 1982).

Each of claimant's absences following her written discipline were either excused by the employer, properly reported and due to her own medical appointment, or for reasonable

grounds when her mother was hospitalized. As such, any discharge due to attendance cannot be disqualifying because the claimant's absences were excused.

Further, claimant credibly testified that she completed all daily tasks assigned to her on her daily agenda and reached out to co-workers and managers for additional work. There is no evidence that the claimant's idle time on the computer stemmed from her intentional failure to work rather than the employer's failure to give her additional work.

Inasmuch as employer had not previously warned claimant about the issue leading to the separation, it has not met the burden of proof to establish that claimant acted deliberately or with recurrent negligence in violation of company policy, procedure, or prior warning. An employee is entitled to fair warning that the employer will no longer tolerate certain performance and conduct. Without fair warning, an employee has no reasonable way of knowing that there are changes that need be made in order to preserve the employment. If an employer expects an employee to conform to certain expectations or face discharge, appropriate (preferably written), detailed, and reasonable notice should be given. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

DECISION:

The December 24, 2019 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is reversed. Claimant was discharged from employment for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided she is otherwise eligible.

Dawn Boucher Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

db/scn