IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU

OTIS M WILSON

Claimant

APPEAL 21R-UI-20142-AW-T

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

IMAGINE THE POSSIBILITIES INC

Employer

OC: 02/14/21

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct Iowa Code § 96.6(2) – Filing – Timely Appeal Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35 – Filing

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Claimant filed an appeal from the March 23, 2021 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified of the hearing. A telephone hearing was scheduled for July 9, 2021. No hearing was held because appellant was not available at the telephone number provided for the scheduled hearing. On July 21, 2021, a default decision was issued dismissing the appeal (21A-UI-11709-SC-T).

On July 27, 2021, claimant appealed to the Employment Appeal Board (EAB). On September 9, 2021, the EAB remanded this matter to the Appeals Bureau for a hearing on the merits. Upon remand, due notice was issued and a hearing was held on November 18, 2021. Claimant participated with his attorney, Zeke McCartney. Employer participated through Shara Muller, Director of Human Resources. No exhibits were admitted. Official notice was taken of the administrative record.

ISSUES:

Whether claimant filed a timely appeal.

Whether claimant's separation was a discharge for disqualifying job-related misconduct.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds:

The Unemployment Insurance Decision was mailed to claimant at the incorrect address on March 23, 2021 (the address listed the correct street address but did not include claimant's unit number). Claimant did not receive the decision. Claimant learned of the decision after calling lowa Workforce Development to check on the status of his claim.

The decision states that it becomes final unless an appeal is postmarked or received by Iowa Workforce Development Appeals Section by April 2, 2021. Claimant appealed the decision online on April 22, 2021. Claimant's appeal was received by Iowa Workforce Development on April 22, 2021.

Claimant was employed as a full-time Direct Support Professional from January 3, 2019 until his employment with Imagine the Possibilities ended on February 15, 2021.

Employer has an attendance policy. The policy is outlined in the employee handbook. Claimant received a copy of the policy.

Claimant was late to work on December 24, 2020 due to car trouble. Claimant was absent from training on January 7, 2021. Claimant did not notify employer of his absence prior to the beginning of training. The reason for claimant's absence is unknown. On February 5, 2021, claimant was late to work due to car trouble.

Claimant received written warnings regarding his attendance on January 13, 2021, January 25, 2021 and February 11, 2021. The warnings stated that future unexcused absences may result in termination of claimant's employment. Claimant was presented with the warnings and was offered a copy.

On February 15, 2021, claimant was not scheduled to work his regular shift. However, claimant was scheduled to attend a house meeting at 1:45 p.m. The house meeting was on claimant's printed and electronic work schedules. Employees are required to attend house meetings. Claimant was informed of this requirement during orientation. House meetings are a form of training that employees must complete to remain qualified to perform their jobs. The house meetings are also required by Medicaid for reimbursement. Claimant did not attend the house meeting on February 15, 2021 and did not notify employer that he would be absent. Claimant did not attend the house meeting because he was tired from working his second job.

Employer discharged claimant on February 15, 2021 for excessive unexcused absenteeism.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant's appeal was timely.

lowa Code § 96.6(2) provides, in pertinent part: "[u]nless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision."

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(1) provides:

- 1. Except as otherwise provided by statute or by division rule, any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document submitted to the division shall be considered received by and filed with the division:
- (a) If transmitted via the United States Postal Service on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark, or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it is received; or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion.
- (b) If transmitted via the State Identification Date Exchange System (SIDES), maintained by the United States Department of Labor, on the date it was submitted to SIDES.

(c) If transmitted by any means other than [United States Postal Service or the State Identification Data Exchange System (SIDES)], on the date it is received by the division.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.35(2) provides:

2. The submission of any payment, appeal, application, request, notice, objection, petition, report or other information or document not within the specified statutory or regulatory period shall be considered timely if it is established to the satisfaction of the division that the delay in submission was due to division error or misinformation or to delay or other action of the United States postal service.

The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. *Franklin v. IDJS*, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. *Beardslee v. IDJS*, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also *In re Appeal of Elliott* 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion? *Hendren v. IESC*, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); *Smith v. IESC*, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973).

Claimant did not receive the decision. Therefore, the appeal notice provisions were invalid. Claimant did not have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. Claimant's appeal is considered timely.

The next issue to be determined is whether claimant's separation from employment is disqualifying. For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes claimant was discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct. Benefits are denied.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)(a) provides:

An individual shall be *disqualified for benefits:*

- 2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
- a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(a) provides:

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith

errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition of misconduct has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Reigelsberger v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 500 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1993); *accord Lee v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 616 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Iowa 2000). Further, the employer has the burden of proof in establishing disqualifying job misconduct. *Cosper v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(8) provides:

(8) Past acts of misconduct. While past acts and warnings can be used to determine the magnitude of a current act of misconduct, a discharge for misconduct cannot be based on such past act or acts. The termination of employment must be based on a current act.

The issue is not whether the employer made a correct decision in separating claimant, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. *Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what misconduct warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate decisions. *Pierce v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. The requirements for a finding of misconduct based on absences are therefore twofold. First, the absences must be excessive. Sallis v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895 (lowa 1989). The determination of whether unexcused absenteeism is excessive necessarily requires consideration of past acts and warnings. Higgins v. lowa Dep't of Job Serv., 350 N.W.2d 187, 192 (lowa 1984). Second, the absences must be unexcused. Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10. The requirement of "unexcused" can be satisfied in two ways. An absence can be unexcused either because it was not for "reasonable grounds," Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191, or because it was not "properly reported," holding excused absences are those "with appropriate notice." Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 10.

Absences due to properly reported illness cannot constitute work-connected misconduct since they are not volitional, even if the employer was fully within its rights to assess points or impose discipline up to or including discharge for the absence under its attendance policy. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7); Cosper, 321 N.W.2d at 9; Gaborit v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 734 N.W.2d 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Medical documentation is not essential to a determination that an absence due to illness should be treated as excused. See Gaborit, 734 N.W.2d at 555-558. An employer's no-fault absenteeism policy or point system is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for unemployment insurance benefits. Absences related to issues of personal responsibility such as transportation, lack of childcare, and oversleeping are not considered excused. Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 191. When claimant does not provide an excuse for an absence the absences is deemed unexcused. Id.; see also Spragg v. Becker-Underwood, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 333, 2003 WL 22339237 (Iowa App. 2003). The term "absenteeism" also encompasses conduct that is more accurately referred to as "tardiness." An absence is an extended tardiness; and an incident of tardiness is a limited absence.

Excessive absenteeism has been found when there have been seven unexcused absences in five months; five unexcused absences and three instances of tardiness in eight months; three unexcused absences over an eight-month period; three unexcused absences over seven months; and missing three times after being warned. See Higgins, 350 N.W.2d at 192 (Iowa 1984); Infante v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984); Armel v. EAB, 2007 WL 3376929*3 (Iowa App. Nov. 15, 2007); Hiland v. EAB, No. 12-2300 (Iowa App. July 10, 2013); and Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 317 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa App. 1982).

It is the duty of the administrative law judge, as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and decide the facts in issue. *Arndt v. City of LeClaire*, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-395 (Iowa 2007). The administrative law judge may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. *State v. Holtz*, 548 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Iowa App. 1996). In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the administrative law judge should consider the evidence using his or her own observations, common sense and experience. *Id.* In determining the facts, and deciding what testimony to believe, the fact finder may consider the following factors: whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence you believe; whether a witness has made inconsistent statements; the witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory and knowledge of the facts; and the witness's interest in the trial, their motive, candor, bias and prejudice. *Id.*

The findings of fact show how I have resolved the disputed factual issues in this case. I assessed the credibility of the witnesses who testified during the hearing, considering the applicable factors listed above, and using my own common sense and experience. I find claimant's testimony that he was unaware that the house meeting was mandatory to lack credibility because the meeting was listed on his work schedule and he received a prior warning for failing to attend other training.

Claimant's absence on December 24, 2020 was due to an issue of personal responsibility (i.e. car trouble), which is not considered reasonable grounds. Therefore, the absence is unexcused.

Claimant's absence on January 7, 2021 was not properly reported. Therefore, the absence is unexcused.

Claimant's absence on February 5, 2021 was due to an issue of personal responsibility and, therefore, is unexcused.

Claimant's absence on February 15, 2021 was not properly reported and was due to an issue of personal responsibility (i.e. fatigue from working a second job). Therefore, the absence is unexcused.

Claimant accrued four unexcused absences in less than two months and after receiving multiple warnings regarding his attendance that put him on notice that his job was in jeopardy. Claimant's final unexcused absence occurred four days after receiving a written warning. Claimant's unexcused absences are excessive. Claimant was discharged for disqualifying, job-related misconduct. Benefits are denied.

DECISION:

The appeal was timely. The March 23, 2021 (reference 01) unemployment insurance decision is affirmed. Claimant was discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct. Benefits are denied.

Adrienne C. Williamson

Administrative Law Judge

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bureau

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December 10, 2021

Decision Dated and Mailed

acw/ACW