

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT  
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BUREAU**

**CHINH V TRAN**

Claimant

**APPEAL 17A-UI-10035-JC**

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
DECISION**

**KANSAS CITY SAUSAGE COMPANY LLC**

Employer

**OC: 09/10/17**

**Claimant: Appellant (2R)**

Iowa Code § 96.5(2)a – Discharge for Misconduct

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) – Excessive Unexcused Absenteeism

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)d – Voluntary Leaving/Illness or Injury

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE:**

The claimant filed an appeal from the September 29, 2017, (reference 02) unemployment insurance decision that denied benefits. The parties were properly notified about the hearing. An in-person hearing was held in Des Moines, Iowa on October 18, 2017. The claimant participated personally and through a Vietnamese interpreter with CTS Language Link. Tai Chalum also attended as an observer. The employer participated through Elizabeth Schultz, human resources generalist. David Flores, assistant human resources generalist, also testified for the employer. Employer Exhibit 1 and Claimant Exhibit A were received into evidence. Based on the evidence, the arguments presented, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

**ISSUE:**

Was the claimant discharged for disqualifying job-related misconduct?

**FINDINGS OF FACT:**

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The claimant was employed full-time as a scribe saw for pig wings, and was separated from employment on September 8, 2017, when he was discharged for excessive absenteeism (Employer Exhibit 1).

The claimant last performed work on May 8, 2017. After leaving work, the claimant went home, where he broke his foot in two places. His injury required surgery with 6 screws to repair damage. The claimant was not eligible for a leave of absence through Family and Medical Leave Act but was granted a personal leave of absence beginning May 9, 2017. Initially, the claimant was expected to return to work after six weeks. His leave of absence was extended as he continued to visit his doctor, who would authorize the claimant more time off to heal (Claimant Exhibit A). He continued to be under doctor's care, and provided the employer three additional requests to extend his leave of absence. The employer granted the requests.

On August 23, 2017, the claimant furnished a doctor's note stating he would need another six weeks off of work, totaling 23 weeks since he last worked. It was unclear if after the six weeks, additional time would be requested to heal. The employer concluded that due to uncertainty with the claimant's return, his position could not continue to be held open. The claimant was discharged (Employer Exhibit 1) with the option to reapply upon being released by his doctor. The employer also helped the claimant transition to his wife's health insurance, because she was also an employee.

At the time of the hearing, the claimant had not been released by his doctor yet to return to any work, without restrictions. His next doctor's appointment is scheduled for November 1, 2017 (Claimant Exhibit A).

### **REASONINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

For the reasons that follow, the administrative law judge concludes the claimant did not quit, but was discharged for no disqualifying reason.

Iowa Code § 96.5-1-d provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual's employer, if so found by the department. But the individual shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

d. The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(35) provides:

Voluntary quit without good cause. In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5. However, the claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving Iowa Code section 96.5, subsection (1), paragraphs "a" through "i," and subsection 10. The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

(35) The claimant left because of illness or injury which was not caused or aggravated by the employment or pregnancy and failed to:

(a) Obtain the advice of a licensed and practicing physician;

(b) Obtain certification of release for work from a licensed and practicing physician;

- (c) Return to the employer and offer services upon recovery and certification for work by a licensed and practicing physician; or
- (d) Fully recover so that the claimant could perform all of the duties of the job.

The court in *Gilmore v. Empl. Appeal Bd.*, 695 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) noted that:

"Insofar as the Employment Security Law is not designed to provide health and disability insurance, only those employees who experience illness-induced separations that can fairly be attributed to the employer are properly eligible for unemployment benefits." *White v. Emp't Appeal Bd.*, 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992) (citing *Butts v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 328 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1983)).

The statute provides an exception where:

The individual left employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence immediately notified the employer, or the employer consented to the absence, and after recovering from the illness, injury or pregnancy, when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing physician, the individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and ... the individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was not available, if so found by the department, provided the individual is otherwise eligible. Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).

Section 96.5(1)(d) specifically requires that the employee has recovered from the illness or injury, and this recovery has been certified by a physician. The exception in section 96.5(1)(d) only applies when an employee is fully recovered and the employer has not held open the employee's position. *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 346; *Hedges v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 368 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see also *Geiken v. Lutheran Home for the Aged Ass'n*, 468 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1991) (noting the full recovery standard of section 96.5(1)(d)).

In the present case, the evidence clearly shows Gilmore was not fully recovered from his injury until March 6, 2003. Gilmore is unable to show that he comes within the exception of section 96.5(1)(d). Therefore, because his injury was not connected to his employment, he is considered to have voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer, and is not entitled to unemployment ... benefits. See *White*, 487 N.W.2d at 345; *Shontz*, 248 N.W.2d at 91.

The Iowa Court of Appeals has informally interpreted the Iowa Code §96.5(1) subsection (d) exception not to require a claimant to return to the employer to offer services after a medical recovery if the employment has already been terminated. *Porazil v. IWD*, No. 3-408 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003).

At most, the claimant's separation from work from March 8, 2017 through September 8, 2017 was a temporary absence while he was medically unable to work. However, employer initiated the end of that voluntary leave period by terminating the employment prior to his medical release to return to work based upon a calendar measurement rather than the treating physician's opinion. Even though employer's use of "termination" may not have meant "discharge," it was clearly the employer's intention to initiate the permanent separation rather than place claimant on an inactive employee list or indefinite unpaid medical leave. Because the claimant was still on indefinite but temporary medical leave and in reasonable communication with employer about his medical status, which indicated his intention to return to

the employment when medically able to do so, and employer terminated the employment relationship before his release, the separation became involuntary and permanent, and is considered a discharge from employment.

Iowa Code section 96.5(2)a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, regardless of the source of the individual's wage credits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:

a. The disqualification shall continue until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. *Huntoon v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv.*, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(7) provides:

(7) Excessive unexcused absenteeism. Excessive unexcused absenteeism is an intentional disregard of the duty owed by the claimant to the employer and shall be considered misconduct except for illness or other reasonable grounds for which the employee was absent and that were properly reported to the employer.

Excessive absences are not considered misconduct unless unexcused. Absences due to properly reported illness or injury cannot constitute job misconduct since they are not volitional. *Cosper v. Iowa Department of Job Service*, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

An employer may discharge an employee for any number of reasons or no reason at all if it is not contrary to public policy, but if it fails to meet its burden of proof to establish job related

misconduct as the reason for the separation, employer incurs potential liability for unemployment insurance benefits related to that separation. A reported absence related to illness or injury is excused for the purpose of the Iowa Employment Security Act. An employer's point system, no-fault absenteeism policy or leave policy is not dispositive of the issue of qualification for benefits.

In spite of the expiration of the claimant's personal leave of absence period, because the final cumulative absence for which he was discharged was related to a properly reported injury and related ongoing medical treatment, no misconduct has been established and no disqualification is imposed. Benefits are allowed, provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.

Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as a condemnation of the employer's right to terminate the claimant for violating its policies and procedures. The employer had a right to follow its policies and procedures. The analysis of unemployment insurance eligibility, however, does not end there. This ruling simply holds that the employer did not meet its burden of proof to establish the claimant's conduct leading separation was misconduct under Iowa law.

**REMAND:** Because the claimant has not been released with restriction from his treating physician, the issue of whether the claimant is able to and available for work, effective September 10, 2017 is delineated in the findings of fact is remanded to the Benefits Bureau of Iowa Workforce Development for an initial investigation and determination.

**DECISION:**

The September 29, 2017, (reference 02) decision is reversed. The claimant did not quit but was discharged for no disqualifying reason. Benefits are allowed, provided he is otherwise eligible.

**REMAND:** The issue of whether the claimant is able to and available for work, effective September 10, 2017 (due to injury) is delineated in the findings of fact is remanded to the Benefits Bureau of Iowa Workforce Development for an initial investigation and determination.

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Jennifer L. Beckman  
Administrative Law Judge

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Decision Dated and Mailed

jlb/scn

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<sup>i</sup> **NOTE TO CLAIMANT:** You may find additional information about food, housing, and other resources by dialing 211 or at [www.211iowa.org](http://www.211iowa.org).